05 10 11 Zetes : In response to "Document may suggest fraud …"

First
of all, the title of the blog, even if in the conditional (“may suggest
fraud”), has been transformed in the press in Kinshasa where fraud is
now supposedly a fact, this without enquiry nor respect for the work
being done.

 As
a partner of the CENI, Zetes participates in a joint effort with the
objective of providing the best information possible to the CENI so that
all in DRC can participate in the coming election.
 In
this perspective, we, as well as other partners, provide information so
that the CENI can analyze, compile, compare and clean data gathered on
the field as to obtain the most reliable collection of records with a
minimized margin of error, errors that are inevitably encountered in
such complex operations. There is no contradictory report to the
official report of the CENI, sole depositary of the official and final
information.
 We
take this opportunity to remind everyone that this kind of large-scale
and complex operation always brings its share of problems we are here to
help solving. We put our reputation at stake as our credibility and
transparency in such operations we undertake and do not wish to see this
work being used for political purposes by feeding rumors that do not
have reason to exist at this stage. Any given number can be made to
speak different kinds of truth. We strongly regret having been exploited
and cited in the local press without having had the opportunity to
comment but we hope this message can bring some reassurance to readers
and will prevent the incorrect use of preliminary and outdated
information in the future.
 Having
a long experience on the subject in hand, here is a statement, as bold
as it may seem, that all involved in electoral processes should very
well be aware of: fraud is impossible to organize at the level of
centralization systems / databases.
Here are different reasons why:
  • It
    is impossible the create/delete persons in a database without anyone
    being aware of it, and there are many actors of different origin
    involved, when following centralization processes that lasts months.
  • All
    transactions in the databases from the field and in the central system
    are logged and linked to the operator who performed the actions so we
    are capable of tracing everything that has been done from beginning to
    end.
  • In
    terms of logistics, it is impossible to organize a fraud from an
    electronic file in proportion that cannot be detected or are of nature
    to have a significant impact. Try creating 100,000 fake voter within a
    database of more than 30 million by duplication. You would then need
    more than 2,000 buses (45 seater) or more than 400 planes (230-seater)
    to move them to other polling stations or manage to instruct 100,000
    people without anybody else noticing. Having done all that, you would
    not even impact 0.3% of the electoral population. 
  • We
    always find in the end the same amount of “real doubles or duplicates”
    here and in many different countries; call it law of numbers. A large
    number of real duplicates for example is 0.5%  based on the total
    electoral population of which in 90% of the cases are people getting
    another card because their name was misspelled or didn’t like their
    picture or just wanted to have two card in case they loose one.
  • The
    nature of a duplicate is complex. The proven frauds (that can only be
    determined after human verification) are a small subset of the real
    duplicates, themselves a subset of the raw duplicates. Even in the
    eventuality that all of these where fraud attempts we are talking about
    way less than half a percent of the number of persons concerned (a
    double being a pair of at least 2 persons).
 Computerized
solution have the advantage of bringing credibility at this stage of
the process by being able to cut down the error margin to bellow the
percent which is seldom the case even in “mature” democracies but
remains necessary in the absence of a computerized national registry to
prevent fraud.
 Errors
on electoral lists in G20 countries are often greater than that even
with electronic voting. With the experience of many projects, people
should now be better aware, where fraud is possible or not, and it is
not at the level of centralization systems that they can occur simply
because it doesn’t make any sense.
 As
a result, we have transmitted information several time in the course of
the process to the CENI and have continued working in order for the
CENI to be able corroborate this with other information available from
other sources and partners. The very presence of many players guarantees
a degree of transparency through the exchange and ongoing consultation,
which reveals that no alteration is possible. These information help
improve the overall viability and confirmed that even though there were
technical glitches, as you mention in you blog, we have early on stated
that there where  no major problems to foresee as we have sufficient
means to address them.
 The
numbers indicated in the blog are of different nature. Raw data is
compared here with cleaned data, already deprived of technical errors.
The comparison is therefore not possible.
 In
the hope that this, if not addressing the use of incomplete statistics
will be reassurance enough to not concede to panic and invite those
preoccupied to ask questions before relaying concerns expressed in this
blog as facts.
We
invite all who have used the information in this blog to read it again
carefully, it expresses concerns that are not facts and it is
irresponsible to use sparse elements in the press without further
inquiry to obtain tangible information that would have inevitably lifted
any doubts.
Kinshasa, October 3, 2011
Fabien MARIE
Program Manager
Zetes PASS

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