12 06 12 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP -Open Letter to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Eastern Congo is
again rapidly destabilising with the defection of Bosco Ntaganda from the
Congolese army and the formation of the M23 Movement, another Tutsi-led
rebellion allegedly supported by Rwanda. The government, weakened by
presidential and legislative elections last November that were widely recognised
as deeply flawed, is seizing the opportunity to please the international
community by at last pursuing the capture of Ntaganda. President Joseph Kabila
seems to be gambling that this is an opportunity to break the parallel
structures maintained by the Congrès national pour la défense du
peuple's (CNDP) within the army, and to remobilise domestic support
around anti-Rwanda sentiment by pursuing a= 0military defeat of the M23. In
addition to the fragmentation of the army and new fighting between the Forces
armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and ex-CNDP elements,
various Mai-Mai groups have expanded their reach and the Forces Democratiques de
Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) remains a persistent, if diminished threat, as the
FARDC fails to control territory.

The stabilisation
strategy underpinned by MONUSCO was centred too heavily on an expectation that
the 2008-2009 rapprochement between DRC and Rwanda was enough to contain the
conflict in the Kivus. The bilateral agreement was based on President
Kabila's willingness to integrate Rwanda's proxy CNDP forces
into the army, but the strategy was short-sighted as it made no provisions for
addressing the underlying causes of conflict beyond Rwanda's security
objectives. The current mutiny underway in the Kivus is perhaps the clearest
evidence to date of how little progress has been made in stabilisation. The 2008
and 2012 crises appear remarkably similar, including their ethnic dimension,
report ed support from Rwanda and the negative impact on civilians, including
displacement and potential for increasing ethnic tensions at the community
level. These crises are symptoms of unresolved regional and local conflicts over
access to land and resources, as well as a failure to achieve structural reform
within the security sector, poor governance and non-existent rule of law, and
the inability to address the sources of financing for armed groups, end impunity
and extend state authority, including through decentralisation.

In this context,
it would be a mistake if the Security Council seeks to make only minor
adjustments to the current course in renewing MONUSCO's mandate.
Without a new approach and re-engagement by the Security Council, MONUSCO risks
becoming a $1.5 billion empty shell.

MONUSCO
has lost credibility on several fronts and urgently needs to reorient its
efforts. 

First, the mission
has had strikingly little success at fulfilling its primary objective to protect
civilians, though some of its innovative operational improvements should be
acknowledged and encouraged. The population remains profoundly vulnerable to
violence and frustrated by the lack of protection as illustrated by the recent
attack on UN peacekeepers in Bunyiakiri, South Kivu. Despite progress against
the FDLR, the threat of armed groups remains pervasive and the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) cites an additional 218,000
internally displaced persons in North Kivu between 1 April and 31 May 2012.
Durable protection of civilians will only come through an enhanced political pr
ocess and the establishment of accountable state institutions.

Secondly, MONUSCO
technical and logistical support to deeply flawed elections in 2011 and the
inability to successfully promote dialogue between the parties has altered
perceptions about the Mission's impartiality. Neither the Security
Council nor MONUSCO articulated clear red lines for the credibility of the
process, and the good offices role of the Mission appeared underutilised. With
the failed decentralisation agenda, constitutional reforms that further expanded
the power of the Presidency and little accountability for violence and massive
fraud associated with the elections, the evidence continues to mount in support
of the concerns Crisis Group expressed to the Security Council last year about
the potentia l for authoritarian drift and consequences of the failure to
resolve grievances through elections. If not corrected, international
involvement in the DRC, including through MONUSCO, risks entrenching an
unaccountable government and undermining its own eventual rule of law and
peacebuilding efforts.

The
Security Council should undertake a review of MONUSCO's strategy and
improve performance.

MONUSCO's
focus on the use of force to stabilise the Kivus is not enough. Despite the
conditionality policy for MONUSCO support to FARDC operations, there remains a
lack of clarity about the overall military strategy and articulation of an end
state to the military operations against illegal armed groups. What is required
is a comprehensive strategy and sustained local and regional engagement by the
international community. Clearly there is a need to address both local drivers
of conflict between communities and the interplay with regional dynamics,
including relations with Rwanda, whether through renewed political dialogue or a
national accountability and reconciliation process, or both.

To bolster the
government's accountability, the holding of credible provincial and
local elections, including in the east, is essential. The mistakes of 2011
should not be repeated and clear standards on the organisation and holding of
elections should be communicated to the government by the Security Council and
MONUSCO, in particular serious reform of the Commission Electorale Nationale
Indépendante (CENI) and improved transparency in the logistics and supply
procedures of the elections. MONUSCO should engage with key stakeholders,
monitor CENI adherence to electoral law and report on the process. MONUSCO
should not support elections that are clearly not credible.

Security sector
reform (SSR) is vital to stability in the DRC, but little progress can be
expected without serious re-engagement and support from all sides, including the
government, MONUSCO, the UN Security Council and key partners. Without a clear
commitment from President Kabila and the government to a broader peacebuilding
agenda, SSR will continue to flounder. The Security Council should only consider
an enhanced role for MONUSCO in SSR as part of a broader political strategy for
stability in eastern Congo and once some progress has been made in enhancing
government accountability, otherwise the UN risks exacerbating rather than
improving instability.

The Security
Council should send a signal to the Congolese government and its partners that
it is time for a new strategic dialogue. A business-as-usual rollover of
MONUSCO's mandate will send the wrong message to all parties.

When renewing
MONUSCO's mandate, the Security Council
should:

• Call on the
  Congolese government to arrest Bosco Ntaganda and transfer him to the
  International Criminal Court for trial;

• Demand the end to
  illegal cross-border support to armed groups operating in the DRC, notably by
  Rwanda, and consider consequences for those parties who do not cease support;
  

• Request the
  Secretary-General to undertake a strategic review of MONUSCO’s stabilisation
  strategy and report back to the UN Security Council, including on the
  development and implementation of a comprehensive strategy, with a strong
  political component, to address pervasive insecurity and the threat of illegal
  armed groups in eastern Congo.

• Enhance attention
  to key governance reforms — such as the holding of credible provincial and
  local elections, decentralisation and progress in the fight against corruption
  — by updating operative paragraph four of Security Council resolution 1991
  (2011) to include their achievement as one of the core objectives that is the
  basis for decisions on reconfiguration of the mission;

• Insist on the
  holding of free, fair and credible provincial and local elections, as well as
  the timely re-organization of legislative elections in Masisi territory that
  were canceled by the CENI;

• Articulate clear
  standards for the holding of elections and condition MONUSCO support on serious
  reform of the CENI and improved transparency in the logistics and supply
  procedures and accountability for past election-related human rights violations.
  

Louise Arbour

President and
CEO