16 07 13 Congo Siasa – From Mutaho to Kampala––What's next?

Then the fighting: in past weeks, a variety of militia loosely allied to
the Congolese government have launched attacks against the M23. Last
week, a small bunch of APCLS Mai-Mai somehow made their way to the north
of Goma to harass the M23; before that, it was the MPA and FDLR-Soki to
the northeast of Rutshuru. And now it is the M23's turn again to strike
against the FARDC, attacking Mutaho, a village overlooking Goma from
the north.

The backdrop of this fighting is provided by the Kampala talks. Here,
too, there are patterns: both parties deploy large delegations to the
Ugandan capital, where they spend weeks at a time without meeting each
other. The Congolese prevaricate between a refusal
to negotiate, an ultimatum for the M23 to sign a proposed deal (several
of these have come and gone), and more a more flexible stance.

What is the current status? On Monday, July 8 the Ugandan facilitator
put a new deal on the table, following a revised proposal by the
Kinshasa delegation. The facilitator's deal would provide for an amnesty
for everything but violations of international law, the integration of
M23 officers and political cadres, a concrete plan for refugee return,
the creation of a National Reconciliation Mechanism, and the declaration
of a state of disaster for the East. The follow-up would be largely
provided by the ICGLR, but would be integrated into the Framework
Agreement, thus allowing UN Special Envoy Mary Robinson and the various
oversight mechanisms to weigh in.

This is more than the Congolese wanted––most notably, they didn't want
to integrate M23 politicians, and suggested that national reconciliation
be spearheaded by the National Oversight Committee for the Framework
Agreement (comité de suivi). Moreover, they will probably shirk
at declaring the East a disaster area, which would commit them to legal
and financial obligations toward provinces in the East (although the
government had done this in 2009).

But the deal is a much bitterer pill for the M23 to swallow. It would
basically require them to disband their movement, accept the deployment
of their officers anywhere in the country, and receive little in return.
For some of their leaders, in particular Makenga and Kaina (as well as
some of those in Bosco's wing, currently in Rwanda), the sentence
"promulgate legislation granting amnesty…taking into account
international law," will leave their personal future in suspense.

So will fighting continue? Will the M23 or the FARDC escalate? Anything
is possible, but I would imagine the Congolese army would wait for the
Intervention Brigade (FIB) to fully deploy, and for the army to carry
out its ongoing restructuring before making a move––and that could take
at least another month. The M23 would have a greater interest in
escalation, perhaps in order to preempt the FIB from deploying or
improving the deal on the table. But their problem continues to be a
lack of troops. With only 1,500-2,500 troops, they have to protect an
area 100km long and some 20-50km wide.

So taking Goma would leave a considerable vacuum along the Rwandan
border, and would probably only be possible with backing from the
Rwandan army––would this once again be forthcoming?