07 10 13 Congo Siasa – Controversy erupts over returnees

For several weeks, there has been a steady movement of
Congolese refugees into the Kibumba area north of Goma, the southern edge of M23
territory. According to several UN sources, there may be up to 3,000 such
returnees in this area, mostly Congolese Tutsi who fled the country, some as
long ago as 1994, and were living in refugee camps in Rwanda.

Another
group of around 100-200 families then arrived on 30 September further north, in
Jomba. According to some sources,
these families may be Rwandans who were expelled from Tanzania weeks
ago.

Very few of these families are probably from this area––a UN
official told me that some of them had tried unsuccessfully to cross toward
Masisi, which is probably where many of them are from. Their presence has raised
questions. Some think that the M23 could use them as human shields in case of
another round of fighting. A UN official told me that, given how close they are
to M23 positions, it would make it difficult to employ UN attack helicopters in
those areas to the same extent as they did during the August fighting against
M23. If their arrival is confirmed, at the very least this is a lack of
foresight and regulation by the various authorities, including UNHCR and the
Rwandan National Council for Refugees.

 

 

The US blocks military
aid to Rwanda

Few
international news outlets picked this up, but it was an important decision.
Yesterday, the US government decided not
to grant a waiver to Rwanda for the use of child soldiers. Every year, the White
House has to provide waivers to countries that the State Department reports as
using child soldiers. This year, that report listed
Rwanda as complicit in the recruitment of child soldiers for the M23. Still, the
government could have provided a waiver––as it did in the case of four
countries––but it chose not to.

This decision is symbolic, as it will
probably only affect around $500,000 in training programs for the Rwandan army,
but is nonetheless important. It can probably be interpreted as the first
official indication in months––the UN Group of Experts report in July suggested
that Rwandan support had declined––that members of the international community
feel that Rwandan support to the M23 continues. The UN suggested as
much in a closed door briefing to the Security Council in late August, but there
has been little public pressure on Rwanda. (President Paul Kagame
even shared a
stage with Elie Wiesel in New York during the General Assembly and discussed health
care with Bill Clinton at the Clinton Global Initiative).

 

How many M23 can
reintegrate?

The
peace talks in Kampala have stalled since President Kabila went to the UN
General Assembly. The two week extension announced by the facilitation has
expired, and while the parties are set to convene again this week in
Kampala––and despite occasions outbursts of optimism from diplomats––there is
little sign that much has fundamentally changed.

The main issue is still
the fate of the top leadership of the M23. While the M23 has officially claimed
that they do not want to integrate into the Congolese army, in practice the
talks have revolved around the issue of amnesty and integration for M23
officers. At a meeting in Mbarara around two weeks ago, the Ugandan facilitation
pushed the Congolese government––represented by the head of the intelligence
service, Kalev Mutond––to be more flexible regarding the issue of amnesty. The
initial position of the Congolese was that there should be no "recidivism," as
they put it. In other words, those who had already benefited from amnesty in the
2009 deal could not receive a second amnesty for the crime of insurrection. That
meant that the entire officer corps of the M23 couldn't integrate. The
Congolese, fresh from their victory against the M23 in late August, seemed eager
to return to the battlefield.

Since then, the Congolese have relaxed
their position a little, without really changing the impasse. On 19 September
2013, Communications Minister Lambert Mende said that
they have a list of around 100 people who couldn't integrate. While the M23
might number between 800-1,500 troops, the list of hundred included every single
important commander (see here for
the list). In recent talks at the UN General Assembly and in Kampala, there are
suggestions that the Congolese could go down to 30 or 40 officers.

But is
the problem here really the Congolese? It is true that excluding 30+ of the top
commanders is tantamount to rejecting any peaceful compromise. But even if the
Congolese would be willing to go down to fewer than ten––which some close to
Kabila suggest they are––it will still be next to impossible to get the M23 to
agree to the arrest or send its own leadership into exile. And it's not just the
Congolese drawing red lines––the US has sanctions against
Kaina and Makenga (and Ngaruye and Zimurinda, who are in Rwanda), and the UN
has denounced the
same five for atrocities.

The closer one looks at the problem, the more
one wonders why so much emphasis is being put on negotiations with the M23, who
are unlikely to hand over their top commanders. More and more, it appears that
the solution for the problems of the M23 has to be sought between Kigali and
Kinshasa, not between Kinshasa and the M23.