31 10 13 Congo Siasa – As the M23 nears defeat, more questions than answers
. It is, however, too soon, to
declare an end to the M23, as the rebels reportedly still occupy the
hills along the Rwandan border between Runyoni and Tshanzu.
How did we get here?
The fighting began last Friday morning on the southern frontline, in the
area of Kibumba. The resumption of hostilities was not surprising,
given that the peace talks in Kampala had fallen apart several days
prior. The following day, the Congolese army began a simultaneous
offensive on the M23's northern flank, as well, where the army had been
massing troops and weapons for several months. Progress was quick––by
Saturday, the army had taken control of Kibumba and on Sunday Kiwanja
was under their control. By Sunday, the army advanced to Rumangabo, the
M23's military base, and Rutshuru, the territorial capital. Today, they
took back Bunagana on the Ugandan border, where the M23's political
leaders had been staying. After heavy bombardment, Congolese troops were
already reported to have scaled the Mbuzi hill and were trying to close
in on Runyoni and Tshanzu.
area of Kibumba. The resumption of hostilities was not surprising,
given that the peace talks in Kampala had fallen apart several days
prior. The following day, the Congolese army began a simultaneous
offensive on the M23's northern flank, as well, where the army had been
massing troops and weapons for several months. Progress was quick––by
Saturday, the army had taken control of Kibumba and on Sunday Kiwanja
was under their control. By Sunday, the army advanced to Rumangabo, the
M23's military base, and Rutshuru, the territorial capital. Today, they
took back Bunagana on the Ugandan border, where the M23's political
leaders had been staying. After heavy bombardment, Congolese troops were
already reported to have scaled the Mbuzi hill and were trying to close
in on Runyoni and Tshanzu.
Africa Defence Review has a summary of the fighting, with a helpful map:
![]("http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-I_3WSMKV-_M/UnG2ep9tLBI/AAAAAAAAAhs/pa3oDG50o38/s1600/M23_retreat_Oct_2013_V2-300x227.png") |
| http://www.africandefence.net/analysis-how-m23-was-rolled-back/ |
The fighting was heaviest around Kibumba, where the M23 put up a fight
and both sides lost troops. Elsewhere, there seems to have been little
resistance by the thinly-stretched M23––reports put their total fighting
force between 800-1,500 troops. By Tuesday, there were rumors that
their military commanders had fled to neighboring Uganda or Rwanda,
although none of these could be verified.
and both sides lost troops. Elsewhere, there seems to have been little
resistance by the thinly-stretched M23––reports put their total fighting
force between 800-1,500 troops. By Tuesday, there were rumors that
their military commanders had fled to neighboring Uganda or Rwanda,
although none of these could be verified.
But why did this round of fighting turn out so differently than previous
ones? How could the Congolese army, usually better known for its
indiscipline and racketeering than its military prowess, knock the M23
out so quickly?
ones? How could the Congolese army, usually better known for its
indiscipline and racketeering than its military prowess, knock the M23
out so quickly?
Three factors were key, but which was paramount is different to discern
for now. There is no doubt that the FARDC is performing much better now
than in 2012. Its command structure has been changed and streamlined,
beginning with the appointment of General Lucien Bahuma as regional
commander in June 2012, and of General François Olenga as land forces
commander in December 2012. These commanders have paid more attention to
making sure logistics were in place and salaries paid on time, boosting
soldiers' morale and enabling the newly-trained commando battalions to
do their job. Then, in January 2013, over a hundred officers––many of
them from the Kivus––were invited to Kinshasa under the pretext of a
seminar on army reform (they are mostly still in Kinshasa today). This
simplified the military hierarchy in North Kivu, which had become
clogged up with competing chains of command, a coterie of high-ranking
officers embezzling funds and issuing contradictory orders.
for now. There is no doubt that the FARDC is performing much better now
than in 2012. Its command structure has been changed and streamlined,
beginning with the appointment of General Lucien Bahuma as regional
commander in June 2012, and of General François Olenga as land forces
commander in December 2012. These commanders have paid more attention to
making sure logistics were in place and salaries paid on time, boosting
soldiers' morale and enabling the newly-trained commando battalions to
do their job. Then, in January 2013, over a hundred officers––many of
them from the Kivus––were invited to Kinshasa under the pretext of a
seminar on army reform (they are mostly still in Kinshasa today). This
simplified the military hierarchy in North Kivu, which had become
clogged up with competing chains of command, a coterie of high-ranking
officers embezzling funds and issuing contradictory orders.
The second factor was the United Nations. Observers on the front lines
reported that the Congolese soldiers were being issued military rations
by the UN, and that UN officers were jointly planning operations with
the Congolese army. UN attack helicopters have been providing support,
although the bulk of the fighting has been carried out by the FARDC.
reported that the Congolese soldiers were being issued military rations
by the UN, and that UN officers were jointly planning operations with
the Congolese army. UN attack helicopters have been providing support,
although the bulk of the fighting has been carried out by the FARDC.
But it may be the third factor that was the determining one––the absence
of support from Rwanda. According to several reports from the
frontlines, despite indications of some cross-border support in the
Kibumba area, the M23 was largely left to its own devices. "The Rwandans
just wouldn't pick up their phone calls," one source close to the M23
leadership told me. This is a drastic change from August, when many
sources––the UN, Human Rights Watch, and foreign diplomats––all reported
hefty support coming across the border. The fact that the M23 did not
put up much of a fight in Kiwanja and Rumangabo was another indication
that they knew they stood no chance against the superior firepower of
the UN and the FARDC. According to several diplomats, the US Secretary
of State John Kerry as well as a senior British diplomat called
President Paul Kagame last Friday to impress how important it was for
Rwanda to sit this out. While similar pressure has been applied
before––President Obama called his Rwandan counterpart with a similar
message last December––this time it may have just been the final straw
for the Rwandan leaders.
of support from Rwanda. According to several reports from the
frontlines, despite indications of some cross-border support in the
Kibumba area, the M23 was largely left to its own devices. "The Rwandans
just wouldn't pick up their phone calls," one source close to the M23
leadership told me. This is a drastic change from August, when many
sources––the UN, Human Rights Watch, and foreign diplomats––all reported
hefty support coming across the border. The fact that the M23 did not
put up much of a fight in Kiwanja and Rumangabo was another indication
that they knew they stood no chance against the superior firepower of
the UN and the FARDC. According to several diplomats, the US Secretary
of State John Kerry as well as a senior British diplomat called
President Paul Kagame last Friday to impress how important it was for
Rwanda to sit this out. While similar pressure has been applied
before––President Obama called his Rwandan counterpart with a similar
message last December––this time it may have just been the final straw
for the Rwandan leaders.
The coming days will be interesting. If the M23 is defeated, the
Rwandan, and possibly the Ugandan governments will have to decide
whether they will arrest the fleeing leaders or give them amnesty. The
Congolese army will be under scrutiny to see how they manage their
victory––any revenge attacks or targeting of suspected M23 collaborators
could spoil the mood, and many will wait to see if they proceed to
target the FDLR as promised. Finally, the impact of a victory on the
larger peace process in the region would be powerful. President Kabila,
who signed the Framework Agreement last February largely due to pressure
from the M23, could shake off some of the pressure on him to carry out
national reforms and would be buoyed by the popularity such a victory
would certainly bring.
Rwandan, and possibly the Ugandan governments will have to decide
whether they will arrest the fleeing leaders or give them amnesty. The
Congolese army will be under scrutiny to see how they manage their
victory––any revenge attacks or targeting of suspected M23 collaborators
could spoil the mood, and many will wait to see if they proceed to
target the FDLR as promised. Finally, the impact of a victory on the
larger peace process in the region would be powerful. President Kabila,
who signed the Framework Agreement last February largely due to pressure
from the M23, could shake off some of the pressure on him to carry out
national reforms and would be buoyed by the popularity such a victory
would certainly bring.
For the moment, however, we should wait to see what the coming days bring.