02 11 13 AMANI ITAKUYA #08: Rebels in suits: tackling civilian support networks of armed groups in the eastern DR Congo

The
different reports of the United Nations Group of Experts (GoE) provide numerous
examples of national and provincial politicians, administrators and
businesspersons, including so-called “candidats malheureux” (those who
failed in the elections), who have provided forms of financial, organizational
and political support to armed groups. Such political-military entrepreneurs
have, for example, initiated the creation of rebel groups, elaborated their
political platforms, and provided the sometimes intoxicating discourses and
political visions needed for attracting recruits and drawing community support.
They have also been instrumental in collecting financial contributions,
fostering links to illicit trade networks, obtaining support among diaspora
populations, and diffusing armed groups’ visions and statements via websites and
social media.

Unfortunately,
neither the Congolese government nor international stakeholders pay much
attention to these rebels in suits, allowing them to operate with impunity. This
is evidenced by the fact that their close links to armed groups are often an
open secret, without this prompting action by the security services. Certainly,
complicity as well as corruption among security agents and other parts of the
state apparatus play an important role in this.  Yet, this impunity also stems
from a profound “laissez faire” approach by the government, who seems to grant
anyone not carrying a gun the benefit of the doubt. The only exception to this
are civilian collaborators of insurgent outfits that Kinshasa sees as a direct
threat, like the M23, or those linked to opposition
movements.

This
immediately points to one of the main dilemmas in tackling the phenomenon of
rebels in suits: how to avoid that collaboration accusations turn into an
instrument of political oppression?  There is no easy answer to this in an
authoritarian political environment with a malfunctioning judicial apparatus,
where violations of the laws surrounding detention and due process are the rule
rather than the exception. In such a context, the fear that pressure on the
government to get tough on armed group collaborators will be a license for a
crackdown on the opposition is not unfounded.

However,
perpetuating the current climate of impunity is clearly undesirable: as long as
civilian support structures remain in place, merely removing the military
components of armed group networks will do little to stem rebel proliferation.
The pool of potential commanders and recruits is nearly inexhaustible and one
group is easily replaced by another, as evidenced by the ever-changing letter
soup of abbreviations of rebel groups active in the eastern DR
Congo.

How,
then, can the problem of civilian armed group supporters be tackled? While
acknowledging that every strategy has its risks, there are a number of options
worth trying. Above all, it seems important to reinforce local civil society and
community organizations in their efforts to hold leaders to account and to
mobilize higher-level authorities to reign in those supporting armed groups.
This does not always need to entail judicial action: moral pressure is perhaps
even more important. It is therefore crucial to also involve community leaders
and spiritual authorities who can send a clear signal that manipulating armed
groups is intolerable.

Furthermore,
armed group support networks must be better investigated and documented. One of
the main challenges to tackling rebels in suits is that evidence of their
involvement is often lacking. While, as mentioned, the Group of Experts conducts
research into these issues, their human and financial resources are insufficient
to cover the eastern DR Congo’s entire rebel kaleidoscope. Moreover, one can
wonder whether Congolese organizations working in rebel-affected areas are not
better placed to systematically monitor and document armed group
networks.

Unfortunately,
there is only little donor funding available for Congolese NGOs and institutes
that research and analyse armed groups, as the bulk goes to humanitarian and
development work. This omission is just another manifestation of aid donors’
general failure to tackle the political roots of armed mobilization, focusing on
its humanitarian consequences instead. However, without addressing the key
movers and shapers of violence, in particular political elites, ending armed
group activity in the eastern DR Congo will remain a distant
hope.

 

Judith
Verweijen is a researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden
and the Conflict Research Group at Ghent University, Belgium. Her research
interests include the internal workings of state and non-state armed forces, the
micro-dynamics of civilian-military interaction, and the militarization of local
governance. She has conducted extensive field research in the eastern DR Congo,
and will continue to do so over the next years