06 11 13 AfricanArguments – Waiting for M24 or a real window of opportunity?

New clashes broke out and the FARDC successively took Kibumba,
Kiwanja, Rutshuru, and the military camps of Rumangabo and Bunagana,
bordering Uganda and Rwanda. This victory, which appeared unlikely only
weeks ago, was achieved by the Congolese army, backed up by the United
Nations Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). On African Defense Review,
Darren Olivier provides an interesting analysis of the military and logistical aspects of the attack.

Whilst I write this piece, government forces are attacking the last
areas held by the M23 rebel group in the forested hills in the east. The
political structure of M23 declared the movement wants to lay down its
arms, but that does not yet seem the case for the military wing.

Will this put an end to what appears to be an endless cycle of
conflict in eastern Congo? Most probably not. But it might remove M23 –
the youngest rebel movement led by Congolese Tutsi, designed, supported
and used by Rwanda – from the map. And that would mean, as Jason Stearns
points out on Congo Siasa, that for the first time since 1996 “an armed group allied to Rwanda is not present in the eastern Congo.”

The end of a misadventure

This is not the place, nor the time, to tell the entire story of M23’s rise and fall, but a quick summary is useful.

The genesis of the movement goes back to January 2012, when Bosco
Ntaganda understood that the Congolese government was about to drop him.
There had been an International Criminal Court warrant on Bosco for
many years and after the 2011 elections there was a lot of pressure on
Kabila to deliver him as a sign of good will. Kinshasa wanted to
capitalize on this arrest to replace Bosco with a more loyal commander,
thus dismantling (at least partially) the ‘army within an army’ that the
CNDP had remained since it was integrated in to the FARDC in 2009.

Bosco returned to the maquis and was followed by a group of
officers, mostly people with a CNPD background, and since 2009, FARDC
commanders. But contrary to earlier rebel movements of this kind, M23’s
capacity to mobilize and recruit people remained low. M23 was the
product of discontent in the ranks of the Tutsi elite in North Kivu but
never managed to extend beyond that. The Banyamulenge (Tutsi from South
Kivu) kept their distance from M23 and managed to remain outside the
conflict. The same is true for the large Hutu community of North Kivu.
Due to their limited support base within Kivu’s Kinyarwanda-speaking
community, M23 lacked the clout to start a proper war, despite the
support Rwanda provided (documented by the UN Group of Experts).
It looked like M23’s main reason for existing was to obtain, through
negotiations, better positions within the army and the government.

For months their capacity to inflict harm was limited to a small area in Rutshuru, but in November, quite unexpectedly, they took Goma. 
They kept it for nearly 2 weeks, and after they moving out, two
parallel processes started. The first one, commonly known as the Kampala
negotiations, led to absolutely nothing. The second was when
international reaction crystalized into the Framework Agreement of Addis Abeba in February 2013.

The most immediate consequence of the agreement was that it announced
the deployment of a UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), composed of
Malawian, South African and Tanzanian soldiers.  This brigade would
“neutralize and disarm [M23], as well as other Congolese rebels and
foreign armed groups in strife-riven eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo.” And most of all, it would fundamentally change the military
power balance in the field. Even after M23 had left Goma, it remained
the most coherent, most organized and best performing military actor in
the Kivus. This was less a result of its own strength, and more a
consequence of the FARDC’s weakness. The announcement of the brigade’s
arrival created a lot of animosity in the field.

But by the time the brigade arrived, M23 had weakened itself, for two
reasons. First, the internal tensions within M23, more precisely
between Sultani Makenga, the commander in chief of the rebellion (close
to Nkunda), and Bosco, burst out into open confrontations. On top of the
traditional cleavages between the two camps (based on clans within the
Tutsi community and regional dissension between Masisi and Rutshuru) was
the strategic question of how to position the movement against the
background of the Framework Agreement and other negotiations. In March
2013, it was clear that Makenga was much more eager than Bosco to
finalise the negotiations with the government and come to some sort of
integration. Makenga won, Bosco fled to The Hague. 200 soldiers were
killed in the fighting; many more were wounded or surrendered. The M23
officers reunited around Makenga, but the movement was much weaker than
before.

The second and most important reason for M23’s decline was the fact
that Rwanda faced a more critical attitude from its most loyal
international partners. The reaction of countries such as the UK, US,
Germany, Sweden and Holland went much further than had before, and
certainly much further than Rwanda had anticipated. Measures were not
only announced but also taken, and Rwanda had to be much more discrete
and careful in its support. M23 immediately felt the difference.

The result is that M23 is today verging on military disappearance. It
tried several times in recent weeks, by grenades and mortar fire on
both Goma and Gisenyi, to create a context where Rwanda would cross the
border and intervene directly in support. Today, the Rwandan army is at
its highest state of alert on the border. But, although the possibility
of Rwandan assistance still exists, it isn’t very likely.

Are we really approaching the end of the M23 misadventure? It looks
like it. Over the past 18 months nobody has won. Not Congo, which was
once more near to imploding, during and after Goma’s fall. Rwanda
neither, which lost a lot of its traditional support in Europe and the
USA (and amongst the population of eastern Congo). The people welcome
what they consider to be a military victory, but they are, at the same
time, afraid that this might only be a short breather in an endless
cycle of violence.

But let us try to identify the new elements in recent developments –
indications that this is not just another chapter in the same old story.

Not the same old story 1: The Congolese army, rising from the ashes?

The Congolese army has gone through a metamorphosis in recent months.
For many years, the FARDC was considered to be a heterogeneous,
undisciplined, badly trained amalgam of different militias. Whenever
there was a problem of armed bandits on the loose, efforts were made to
resolve it by “integrating” them into the “regular” army, and giving the
command to the one who has done most to violate human rights.

There were many reasons why the unification of the army did not
succeed. Firstly, logistics: Regrouping the militias, registering each
soldier individually, training them, re-shuffling them and deploying
them into new units, all require the use of barracks. But there are
none, or at least very few.

There is also the matter of natural resources. A large number of
armed groups (whether or not they have been integrated into the national
army) only survive economically because they have taken possession of a
mine, or some commercial concern, etc. and they are reluctant to
abandon their possession. Then there was the question of transparency
and good management, or rather the absence thereof. In fact the less
clear the army’s organisational structure, the greater opportunities
there are for those at the head of it to embezzle large sums of money.

The many international efforts to assist the Congolese authorities in
setting up a defense apparatus capable of guaranteeing the security of
the Congolese people had a disappointing impact. This was acknowledged
in a very critical report from the European Court of Auditors in September 2013.

The result was a phantom army which was more a part of the problem
than its solution. It was systematically listed among the most serious
violators of human rights. In short, it was an army that was dangerous
for everybody except the enemy.

This has, however, changed recently, becoming visible from July
onwards. It goes back to the replacement of General Gabriel Amisi aka
‘Tango Four’ by General François Olengha as Chief of staff of the army’s
land forces in November 2012. In February 2013, 115 commanding officers
from Ituri, South and North Kivu were called back to Kinshasa on the
pretext of a military seminar and kept there. All of them were
considered to be much more involved in business activities around the
army than in military operations. They were also suspected of lacking
loyalty to the national cause. Their involvement in different local
commercial, ethnic and other networks made it impossible to provide
effective leadership. The replacement of General Mayala by General
Bahuma as Commander of the military region that covers North Kivu was
also very important.

Their disappearance from the field improved a lot of practical
issues: the logistics became better organized, uniforms, arms and
ammunition were available where and when they were needed and salaries
were paid. The first successes gave a boost to the army and created a
wave of solidarity towards the army among the population, something
which was previously unheard of. Contrary to Amisi’s period of command,
the battalions formed by the Belgians and the South Africans were
deployed on the front line and made a significant difference – providing
evidence that the international efforts to reinforce the army were not
all that bad.

A Congolese army that can carry out successful operations is an
important development, but a successful reform of the security sector is
something else.  The challenge will be to consolidate it in North Kivu
and to extend it to the rest of the country. The performance of the
FARDC might not be enough to give the country a disciplined and
effective army, but it is a good start.

Not the same old story 2: Monusco

A similar metamorphosis was witnessed within Monusco. Since its
deployment, the UN peacekeeping mission never gave the impression that
it could fulfill its mission and protect the Congolese people. The Blue
Helmets were considered as non-proactive, with a rather vague role,
often absent at the time and place of the action, with too little
coordination between civil and military structures, too distant from the
Congolese people and heartily loathed by them.

This also changed as part of the Framework Agreement.  The arrival of
the FIB and the replacement of Roger Meece by the German diplomat
Martin Kobler made a big difference. Kobler has made a big effort to be
close to the field and accessible to the Congolese population. He is
also a much better communicator than his recent predecessors.

Of course these changes wouldn’t have been possible without the Security Council’s decision on March 28^th 2013 to renew and extend Monusco’s mandate to make the Framework Agreement operational.

 

Not the same old story 3: Rwanda closely monitored by its allies

It is clear that M23’s military force was diminished by the prompt
action of the international community, which reacted faster and sharper
than usual. Rwanda was heavily criticized by some of its most loyal
partners. In Washington, London, The Hague, Berlin and Stockholm,
immediate measures were taken to cut or suspend parts of their bilateral
support. Rwanda overplayed its hand in its M23 gamble. Even after most
of its partners lifted or alleviated the measures, it was absolutely
clear that its future moves and actions would be looked upon with great
suspicion. The traditional partners of Rwanda went way beyond its worst
fears.

Not the same old story 4: Africans claim ownership of the conflict

Another development worth mentioning is that African countries and
multilateral institutions have been quite eager to play a role in the
process of solving this conflict. Or at least preventing it from
developing into an open regional war. Not only did they confront the
traditional protagonists, they also confronted each other. The
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (Kenya, the DRC and
its nine immediate neighbours) worked intensively to keep the conflict
within its existing limits, the SADC countries tried to get actively
involved (Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania have sent troops for the
FIB), the African Union also sought its own visibility and leadership.

It is an interesting development and it is not impossible that the
result will be the power balance between and within African regions
might be reformulated.  The first signs of redrawing the map of African
multilateral institutions are already visible: Tanzania’s role in the
FIB led to tensions with Rwanda which put a lot of pressure on the East
African Community. Rwanda founded the Coalition of the Willing with Uganda and Kenya, which motivated Tanzania (member of ICGLR, EAC as well as SADC) to say that it might consider to withdrawing from the EAC.

A window of opportunity?

You can’t summarise an event whilst still in the middle of it.
 Fighting has remained intense during the last few days, but at the very
moment I am finalising this text it seems that M23’s last bastions have
been taken and the rebels have given up their insurgency
– declaring that they now want to achieve their goals through purely
political means. It is not yet clear what this means for the last round
of negotiations in Kampala.

But if the violence around M23 comes to an end, progress will have to
be made in other areas – for example on other armed groups. The FIB did
not come for M23 alone; their Terms of Reference stipulate they are
there to disarm all armed groups. Who will be next? It has been
suggested that one of the reasons Rwanda kept quiet in the last weeks is
due to guarantees it has had that the FDLR is next on the list.

Congo will have to do the rest of the homework it committed itself to in Addis Ababa: 
reforming the security sector and government institutions, consolidate
the state authority in the east and prevent  armed groups from
destabilizing neighbouring countries, strengthening the agenda of
reconciliation, tolerance and democratization, to make progress in the
decentralization process. Such a shopping list does not appear to be
very concrete.

If the violence in the east stops or even decreases, the focus of
attention will be brought back on to the political scene – afterall, the
M23 misadventure started after controversial elections. There is a
pervasive climate of distrust, not only between majority and opposition,
but also internally within the majority and the opposition. Kabila made
an interesting strategic move going forward: he appointed Augustin
Matata Ponyo as Prime Minister. Matata Ponyo had worked in the
international financial world and as Congo’s Minister of Finance; he had
been responsible for the macroeconomic successes in the previous
legislature. His profile is more technocratic than political. Matata
started to reform the administration, injecting bits of good governance
and installing mechanisms of control which go against the interests of
those who controlled the ship of the state before him.

Just after M23 left Goma, Kabila announced a process to increase
national cohesion.  Everyone had their own understanding of what a
process of increasing national cohesion could or should look like, or
what it should even be called. Eventually des concertations nationales
were organised in September and October 2013 and a list of
recommendations were adopted. Kabila announced a new government, but it
is not clear yet what it will look like or who will lead it.

Some people fear that the PPRD barons and party apparatchiks around
Secretary-General Boshab see this as an excellent occasion to get rid of
Prime Minister Matata Ponyo. They wouldn’t be at all averse to sending
‘le petit’ into the desert as a scapegoat. We can’t exclude that a
government reshuffle will be presented as a reform, while in reality it
is the opposite – the restoration of the previous, pre-Matata regime,
with negative consequences for real reform.

Kris Berwouts has, over the last 25 years, worked for a
number of different Belgian and international NGOs focused on building
peace, reconciliation, security and democratic processes. Until
recently, he was the Director of EurAc, the network of European NGOs
working for advocacy on Central Africa. He now works as an independent
expert on Central Africa.