14 11 13 Congo Siasa – What's left to save in Kampala?

The Congolese refuse to sign an
"agreement" (accord) and merely want to issue a "declaration" to conclude
the talks. The M23 and the Ugandan mediation, meanwhile, are pushing for a
formal, binding agreement.

The Congolese––who have been blamed by the
Ugandan mediation for the failure, and who in their turn blame Museveni––don't
see why they should sign a binding agreement with an organization that no longer
exists. "No
country in history has signed an agreement with a movement that has declared its
own dissolution," said the
Congolese information minister. The Congolese delegation is under pressure from
a Congolese public that never liked the Kampala talks and is all the more
opposed now that the M23 has been militarily defeated. Meanwhile, the M23
leadership, who have little to gain personally by signing a deal, as they are
unlikely to receive any high-ranking positions, don't want to hand the Congolese
a diplomatic victory on top of the military one. 

They
seemed to be backed in this position by the Ugandan facilitation, who, after
all, has most of their military leaders in custody. The Ugandans immediately
blamed the Congolese, saying they had been given a long time to study the
agreement and refused even to enter the room with the M23. The Ugandans
later made a
semi-veiled threat, saying the M23 "can still regroup," something that would
only be possible with Ugandan complicity, as the M23 rebels are now largely in
the custody of their army. 

Why
is a deal still important? For several reasons. First, there could be over 2,500
M23 soldiers still at large––390 have turned themselves over to the Congolese
army, around 150 surrendered to the UN mission, over 600 are in Rwanda since
Bosco Ntaganda's defection last April, and the Ugandans claim (although it begs
credulity) that there are 1,700 on their soil. The peace deal would have given
amnesty for crimes of insurrection and could have paved the way for the
rank-and-file, at least, to come back home and enter demobilization or army
integration. Now they are sitting around, an accident waiting to happen. This
was the argument that Martin Kobler, the head of the UN mission,made yesterday.

Secondly,
a peace deal would clearly state that there will be no amnesty for war crimes or
crimes against humanity, at least theoretically preventing the Congolese from
striking any deals with commanders with blood on their hands (although those
deals are fairly unlikely now).

Finally,
a peace deal would allow for the diplomatic process to continue. It would allow
President Museveni's role––as controversial as it was––to be officially
recognized, and bring the Kampala talks to a close. It would allow for Rwanda,
Congo, and Uganda to put the M23 behind them and move forward on substantive
issues of regional integration and dealing with other armed groups, such as the
FDLR and ADF-Nalu. And it would marginalize the top M23 leadership, like Sultani
Makenga and Innocent Kaina. 

For
now, however, a peace deal seems a long way off. The international envoys have
left Kampala, a war of blame has started between Kampala and Kinshasa, and only
a small skeleton crew remains at the negotiation table.