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In February US President Barack Obama publicly condemned a bill criminalising homosexuality in Uganda,cautioning Uganda's
President Yoweri Museveni that "enacting this legislation will
complicate our valued relationship". Yet five weeks later Obama notified
Congress that the US was sending 150
Air Force Special Operations forces and other personnel, plus several
CV-22 Ospreys and refuelling aircraft, to aid Uganda's 25-year pursuit
of Joseph Kony, leader of the notorious Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).
Shortly after, the US military abruptly announced that it was pulling the aircraft out of the mission.
What
is going on? These twists and turns are puzzling – and troubling – and
not just because they undercut well-deserved US denunciation of Uganda's
new anti-homosexuality law.
Moreover,
the recent dispatch of US military support to Uganda to hunt Kony comes
at a time when the threat posed by the LRA is vastly overshadowed by
far more troubling armed violence in the three Central African countries
where LRA fighters are located.
In
the Central African Republic (CAR), opposing armed groups have for
months committed massive atrocities and pushed an already weak and
troubled state to the brink of collapse. Immediately east of CAR, the
world's newest nation – South Sudan – is embroiled in an armed conflict
that began in December as a power struggle within the country's ruling
political party, but has escalated into widespread fighting that
threatens an extended civil war, with dangerous ethnic overtones. And
just to CAR's south, in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the
long-suffering population continues to be preyed upon by many armed
groups besides the LRA, not least the country's army.
While
the US has voiced alarm about these emergencies, until recently it has
provided limited practical assistance. US Secretary of State John
Kerry's recent visits to South Sudan and DRC could change this, although
it is as yet unclear what the effect of these visits will be. In this
context, the high priority of the LRA in US policy is surprising.
The dissolution of the LRA
Originally
an insurgency based in northern Uganda, the LRA became notorious
between 1988-2006 for atrocities against civilians (including killings,
mutilations and abductions), although Ugandan government army abuses and
structural violence was even more deadly, especially the government
policy of forced internal displacement of 1.2 million people at the epicentre of the war.
Following
failed peace talks in late 2008, the LRA scattered across wide swaths
of heavily forested and lightly administered territory in adjacent parts
of the DRC, South Sudan and CAR. There, an initial phase of large-scale
LRA killings, abductions and civilian displacements in the region has
been succeeded by dwindling rebel strength. Operating far from their
original northern Uganda base – and hunted, if sporadically, by Ugandan
and other national armies since (recently operating under an African
Union mandate) – the LRA managed their last large-scale attacks in the totalling in early 2010.
Since
then they have splintered into ever smaller, increasingly uncoordinated
bands totaling probably less than 200 fighters. When the last sizable
group of 19 LRA fighters abandoned the movement and came out of the bush
in December 2013, for example, our interviews with this group showed
how they had no contact with the rebel high command for for up to
two-and-a-half years.
While
some LRA attacks and (mostly short-term) abductions continue, the
frequency and severity of such incidents has fallen to a level where the
rebel group has become a relatively minor threat.
Indeed,
violent killings attributed to the LRA in rebel-affected areas of
northeastern DRC last year occurred at a rate far less than in the US:
2.9 per 100,000 population (our estimate) vs 4.8 per 100,000 in
the US. And although no similar statistics are available for the CAR or
South Sudan, the armed conflicts currently under way in both these
countries have undoubtedly resulted in casualties and displacements far
surpassing – and unrelated to – those caused by the LRA .
Why is Kony still important?
Yet the US has just committed more military personnel and equipment to hunt Kony. In October 2011 when the first 100 US troops were
deployed, the LRA was already much weakened. This was even more the
case by early 2014 when the latest US military commitment was announced.
So,
again, what is going on? The only reasonable explanation is that the
LRA has become an almost exclusively internal US issue, driven by
domestic US politics rather than realities on the ground in Central
Africa.
First,
there is the influence of the advocacy groups. The most visible of
these is Invisible Children (IC). Launched by a short film of the same
name in 2004, IC became a US popular culture phenomenon, lucrative fund
raiser, and powerful voice focusing on the LRA. Indeed, IC – along with
the Enough Project and Resolve – was crucial in convincing the Obama
administration to send the first advisers and supporting equipment to
help Uganda "capture or kill" Kony.
Second,
for the administration (with rare bipartisan support in Congress), the
LRA issue seemed an easy political win: With relatively little effort – a
handful of troops – the US could help catch one of the world's most
wanted men while satisfying an important domestic political
constituency. One former US government source told us that Obama never
directly informed Museveni about this initial dispatch of US troops,
announcing it instead in a Washington press conference – an unmistakable
signal of the policy's centre of gravity, and to which audience the
policy needed most to be communicated.
Third,
shifting US power relations with respect to the LRA policy proved
highly influential. The centre of gravity over the last year has swung
towards the Department of Defense, with a more pro-active AFRICOM
command promoting greater engagement in the hunt for Kony. This could
explain the delivery of the Osprey aircraft. The fact that they were
abruptly recalled only a month later reinforces our argument that US
decisions, even by the US military, are being taken independently of the
situation on the ground.
By
framing the LRA issue as a personal and technical military problem,
rather than a political one, a single goal – with a short timeline – has
been set: to catch Kony. In this scenario, both Invisible Children and
the Obama administration are caught in a trap of their own making (even
if the trap was bated by the Ugandan government, which has long promoted
the same view of the LRA "problem").
In
this situation, US withdrawal from the hunt would be perceived as a
failure, both for the government and advocacy groups such as Invisible
Children. Pressure to succeed is heightened by the fact that momentum
surrounding the LRA issue is diminishing, or has already passed. Support
for IC has recently plummeted:
donations are sharply down resulting in a one-third reduction in staff
and many programmes cut or eliminated. In recent interviews, remaining
IC staffers indicate they would not mind moving on, but feel stuck in
trying to raise attention for a dying cause. A similar logic holds for
the Obama administration: If it is to gain further political capital out
of the LRA issue it needs to act – and succeed – fast.
In
sum, the projection of US internal politics and the influence of US
advocacy groups into the violent Central African region has led to an
extremely cynical situation: An important US intervention in what
constitutes a minor problem is occurring in the midst of truly
large-scale violence and instability which has failed to prompt
commensurate US political or material support.
This
myopic and distorted vision has exaggerated the significance of the LRA
and obscured the major drivers of insecurity and armed violence in
Central Africa, to the detriment not only of those caught up in that
violence but genuine strategic and humanitarian interests.
Kristof
Titeca is based at the Institute of Development Policy and Management
(University of Antwerp) and the Conflict Research Group (Ghent
University). He is currently a visiting fellow in the Department of
International Development, London School of Economics.
Ronald
R Atkinson is a Senior Research Associate at Walker Institute of
International and Area Studies, University of South Carolina.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
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