Opening the Secret Files on Lumumba's Murder

By Stephen R. Weissman

Washington Post, July 21, 2002

Reposted by permission of the author. Dr.
Weissman was staff director of the U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee on
Africa from 1986 to 1991. He has done extensive research on U.S. policy in the
Congo as well as other African countries.

In his latest film, "Minority Report," director
Steven Spielberg portrays a policy of "preemptive action" gone wild in
the year 2054. But we don't have to peer into the future to see what harm faulty
intelligence and the loss of our moral compass can do. U.S. policies during the
Cold War furnish many tragic examples. One was U.S. complicity in the overthrow
and murder of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.

Forty-one years ago, Lumumba, the only leader ever
democratically elected in Congo, was delivered to his enemies, tortured and
summarily executed. Since then, his country has been looted by the
U.S.-supported regime of Mobutu Sese Seko and wracked by regional and civil war.

The conventional explanation of Lumumba's death has been
that he was murdered by Congolese rivals after earlier U.S. attempts to kill
him, including a plot to inject toxins into his food or toothpaste, failed. In
1975, the U.S. Senate's "Church Committee" probed CIA assassination
plots and concluded there was "no evidence of CIA involvement in bringing
about the death of Lumumba."

Not so. I have obtained classified U.S. government
documents, including a chronology of covert actions approved by a National
Security Council (NSC) subgroup, that reveal U.S. involvement in — and
significant responsibility for — the death of Lumumba, who was mistakenly seen
by the Eisenhower administration as an African Fidel Castro. The documents show
that the key Congolese leaders who brought about Lumumba's downfall were players
in "Project Wizard," a CIA covert action program. Hundreds of
thousands of dollars and military equipment were channeled to these officials,
who informed their CIA paymasters three days in advance of their plan to send
Lumumba into the clutches of his worst enemies. Other new details: The U.S.
authorized payments to then-President Joseph Kasavubu four days before he ousted
Lumumba, furnished Army strongman Mobutu with money and arms to fight
pro-Lumumba forces, helped select and finance an anti-Lumumba government, and
barely three weeks after his death authorized new funds for the people who
arranged Lumumba's murder.

Moreover, these documents show that the plans and payments
were approved by the highest levels of the Eisenhower administration, either the
NSC or its "Special Group," consisting of the national security
adviser, CIA director, undersecretary of state for political affairs, and deputy
defense secretary.

These facts are four decades old, but are worth unearthing
for two reasons. First, Congo (known for years as Zaire) is still struggling to
establish democracy and stability. By facing up to its past role in undermining
Congo's fledgling democracy, the United States might yet contribute to Congo's
future. Second, the U.S. performance in Congo is relevant to our struggle
against terrorism. It shows what can happen when, in the quest for national
security, we abandon the democratic principles and rule of law we are fighting
to defend.

In February, Belgium, the former colonial power in Congo,
issued a thousand-page report that acknowledged "an irrefutable portion of
responsibility in the events that led to the death of Lumumba." Unlike
Belgium, the United States has admitted no such moral responsibility. Over the
years, scholars (including myself) and journalists have written that American
policy played a major role in the ouster and assassination of Lumumba. But the
full story remained hidden in U.S. documents, which, like those I have examined,
are still classified despite the end of the Cold War, the end of the Mobutu
regime and Belgium's confession.

Here's what they tell us that, until now, we didn't know,
or didn't know for certain:

* In August 1960, the CIA established Project Wizard.
Congo had been independent only a month, and Lumumba, a passionate nationalist,
had become prime minister, with a plurality of seats in the parliament. But U.S.
presidential candidate John F. Kennedy was vowing to meet "the communist
challenge" and Eisenhower's NSC was worried that Lumumba would tilt toward
the Soviets.

The U.S. documents show that over the next few months, the
CIA worked with and made payments to eight top Congolese — including President
Kasavubu, Mobutu (then army chief of staff), Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko,
top finance aide Albert Ndele, Senate President Joseph Ileo and labor leader
Cyrille Adoula — who all played roles in Lumumba's downfall.

The CIA joined Belgium in a plan, detailed in the Belgian
report, for Ileo and Adoula to engineer a no-confidence vote in Lumumba's
government, which would be followed by union-led demonstrations, the
resignations of cabinet ministers (organized by Ndele) and Kasavubu's dismissal
of Lumumba.

* On Sept. 1, the NSC's Special Group authorized CIA
payments to Kasavubu, the U.S. documents say. On Sept. 5, Kasavubu fired Lumumba
in a decree of dubious legality. However, Kasavubu and his new prime minister,
Ileo, proved lethargic over the following week as Lumumba rallied supporters. So
Mobutu seized power on Sept. 14. He kept Kasavubu as president and established a
temporary "College of Commissioners" to replace the disbanded
government.

* The CIA financed the College and influenced the
selection of commissioners. The College was dominated by two Project Wizard
participants: Bomboko, its president, and Ndele, its vice-president. Another CIA
ally, Lumumba party dissident Victor Nendaka, was appointed chief of the
security police.

* On Oct. 27, the NSC Special Group approved $250,000 for
the CIA to win parliamentary support for a Mobutu government. However, when
legislators balked at approving any prime minister other than Lumumba, the
parliament remained closed. The CIA money went to Mobutu personally and the
commissioners.

* On Nov. 20, the Special Group authorized the CIA to
provide arms, ammunition, sabotage materials and training to Mobutu's military
in the event it had to resist pro-Lumumba forces.

The full extent of what one U.S. document calls the
"intimate" relationship between the CIA and Congolese leaders was
absent from the Church Committee report. The only covert action (apart from the
assassination plots) the committee discussed was the August 1960 effort to
promote labor opposition and a no-confidence vote in the Senate.

How did Lumumba die?

After being ousted Sept. 5, Lumumba rallied support in
parliament and the international community. When Mobutu took over, U.N. troops
protected Lumumba, but soon confined him to his residence. Lumumba escaped on
Nov. 27. Days later he was captured by Mobutu's troops, beaten and arrested.

What happened next is clearer thanks to the Belgian report
and the classified U.S. documents. As early as Christmas Eve 1960, College of
Commissioners' president Bomboko offered to hand Lumumba over to two
secessionist leaders who had vowed to kill him. One declined and nothing
happened until mid-January 1961, when the central government's political and
military position deteriorated and troops guarding Lumumba (then jailed on a
military base near the capital) mutinied. CIA and other Western officials feared
a Lumumba comeback.

On Jan. 14, the commissioners asked Kasavubu to move
Lumumba to a "surer place." There was "no doubt," the
Belgian inquiry concluded, that Mobutu agreed. Kasavubu told security chief
Nendaka to transfer Lumumba to one of the secessionist strongholds. On Jan. 17,
Nendaka sent Lumumba to the Katanga region. That night, Lumumba and two
colleagues were tortured and executed in the presence of members of the Katangan
government. No official announcement was made for four weeks.

What did the U.S. government tell its Congolese clients
during the last three days of Lumumba's life? The Church Committee reported that
a Congolese "government leader" advised the CIA's Congo station chief,
Larry Devlin, on Jan. 14 that Lumumba was to be sent to "the home
territory" of his "sworn enemy." Yet, according to the Church
Committee and declassified documents, neither the CIA nor the U.S. embassy tried
to save the former prime minister.

The CIA may not have exercised robotic control over its
covert political action agents, but the failure of Devlin or the U.S. embassy to
question the plans for Lumumba could only be seen by the Congolese as consent.
After all, secret CIA programs had enabled this group to achieve political
power, and the CIA had worked from August through November 1960 to assassinate
or abduct Lumumba.

Here, the classified U.S. chronology provides an important
postscript. On Feb. 11, 1961, with U.S. reports from Congo strongly indicating
Lumumba was dead, the Special Group authorized $500,000 for political action,
troop payments and military equipment, largely to the people who had arranged
Lumumba's murder.

Devlin has sought to distance himself from Lumumba's
death. While the CIA was in close contact with the Congolese officials involved,
Devlin told the Church Committee that those officials "were not acting
under CIA instructions if and when they did this." In a recent phone
conversation with Devlin, I posed the issue of U.S. responsibility for Lumumba's
death. He acknowledged that, "It was important to [these] cooperating
leaders what the U.S. government thought." But he said he did "not
recall" receiving advance word of Lumumba's transfer. Devlin added that
even if he had objected, "That would not have stopped them from doing
it."

By evading its share of moral responsibility for Lumumba's
fate, the United States blurs African and American history and sidesteps the
need to make reparation for yesterday's misdeeds through today's policy. In
1997, after the Mobutu regime fell, the Congolese democratic opposition pleaded
in vain for American and international support. Since then, as many as 3 million
lives have been lost as a result of civil and regional war. The United States
has not supported a strong U.N. peacekeeping force or fostered a democratic
transition. The collapse in late April 2002 of negotiations between Congolese
factions threatens to reignite the smoldering conflict or ratify the partition
of the country.

Our government's actions four decades ago in Congo also
have special meaning after the tragedy of Sept. 11. They warn that even as we
justly defend our land and our people against terrorists, we must avoid the
excessive fear and zeal that lead to destructive intervention betraying our most
fundamental principles.

 

---

Parliamentary Committee of enquiry in charge of
determining the exact circumstances of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and
the possible involvement of Belgian politicians

[brief excerpts from conclusions]

The full 1,000 page report of the committee is available
in French and Flemish at:

http://www.lachambre.be/commissions/LMB/indexF.html
and

http://www.lachambre.be/commissions/LMB/indexN.html

Links to a summary,
introduction, and conclusions
in English, can be found here.

THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ENQUIRY COMMITTEE

December 2001

I. THE FIGHT AGAINST LUMUMBA

1. Political Elimination

Lumumba was and remains a striking yet controversial
personality. He was called a Satan by some, and honoured as a true people's hero
by others. The latter mythologized Lumumba after his death. Indeed, it is a fact
that he was the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the Congo. …

Between 10 and 14 July, following the beginning of the
Belgian military intervention and the interruption of diplomatic relations,
there was a spiral of mutual accusations, leading to a complete split. During
that period, the Belgian government – convinced of the fact that it no longer
had to consider the Lumumba government – attempted to influence the creation of
a new Congolese government. … In order to finance the policy against the
Lumumba government, the Belgian government appealed to so-called secret funds,
only some of which were approved by Parliament. …

The Belgian action is only one element in a wider group of
opposition forces. Crucial to the final fall of Lumumba was the split between
the Congolese Prime Minister and the UN Secretary General Hammarskj”ld,
because it forced Lumumba on the one hand to (openly) ask for the support of the
Soviet Union and on the other hand encouraged the United States (behind the
scenes) to organise active opposition against Lumumba (with the first plans of
physical elimination). …

The activities of the Commission have been aimed at
detecting possible Belgian responsibilities in the murder of Patrice Lumumba.
But it is clear that a Belgian, or even an American action had little or no
chance of success without the existence of internal opposition within the Congo
itself. … different factors, domestic as well as foreign, can be shown to have
contributed to the deposition of Prime Minister Lumumba on 5 September 1960.
After 5 September, there was a period of great confusion. …

During this period, the Belgian government was especially
concerned about the actions of Lumumba. After having given its support to the
deposition of Prime Minister Lumumba, it was eager to prevent him from returning
to power and this was a real possibility. … When, finally, Mobutu took action
to arrest Lumumba on 10 October, which he had always refused to do until that
time, it was in exchange for a Belgian promise to provide technical and military
support to the Arm‚e Nationale Congolaise (ANC). The Belgian government was
opposed to all possible forms of reconciliation, direct or indirect, between the
Congolese leaders. The expression "‚limination d‚finitive" by
Minister d'Aspremont Lynden on 6 October 1960 – in a telex to the ambassador
Rothschild in Elisabethstad – should be seen from this perspective.

Conclusion:

With regard to the exact circumstances of the murder of
Patrice Lumumba: after a thorough analysis, it is highly probable that Lumumba
was executed in the jungle on 17 January 1961 between 9.40 pm and 9.43 pm,
within 5 hours after his arrival in Katanga (for a more detailed description,
the commission refers to the experts' report). Regarding the possible
involvement of Belgian politicians: The transfer of Lumumba to Katanga was
organised by the Congolese authorities in Leopoldstad, supported by Belgian
government authorities, especially the Ministers of Foreign and African Affairs
and their colleagues.

Belgian advisors in Leopoldstad collaborated with the
organisation of the transfer. No single document, of which the commission is
aware, indicates that the Belgian government or a member thereof gave the order
to physically eliminate Lumumba. The investigation does not show that the
Belgian authorities premeditated the murder of Lumumba when it attempted to
transfer him to Katanga. It is very clear, though, that the physical safety of
Lumumba was of no concern to the Belgian government. It deemed the safety of
Lumumba less important than other interests. By not considering the possible
risks of the transfer, not asking guarantees for his physical safety or
insisting on humane treatment and a trial, the Belgian government and especially
the Minister of African Affairs showed a lack of forethought and a lack of
respect for the constitutional state.

After hearing about the events of 17 January, the
government, or at least certain members of it, acted irresponsibly by opting to
spread lies to the public and all its allies. This attitude inevitably raised
doubts about the role of the Belgian authorities. Considering the preceding, the
current norms regarding public morality and, without considering the personal
and moral considerations of that time, the commission concludes that certain
members of the Belgian government and other Belgian participants were morally
responsible for the circumstances leading to the death of Lumumba.