1960 – THE UNITED NATIONS’ USE OF FORCE IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: THE QUESTION OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY INSUBORDINATION IN ONUC’S OPERATIONS IN KATANGA.

Introduction

 The African post-independence period had been
one of the most critical eras in the history of many nations. Some had a smooth
and peaceful transition, while other went through tumultuous situations
necessitating international support of various natures. Many factors justified
the sudden eruption of violent conflicts in newly decolonized states. Among
these were the lack of experience and skills in the management of state affairs
on the part of newly promoted leaders, hidden and secret agendas and
instigation of trouble to justify immixion in their former colonies’ affairs,
on the part of former metropolis. The disorder engendered by the struggle for
independence and/or a difficult transition from colony to new state created too
much pressure on the United Nations at the peak of the Cold War. The United Nations’ support, either in
the form of Trusteeship or peacekeeping operations, was the only way to avoid
confrontation of Superpowers on the ground of protecting their zone of
influence and interests.

The Congo did not
make an exception to post-independence conflicts, as was the case in many
African countries. Early after its independence, the Congo faced a breakdown of law and
order and generalized chaos, which prompted authorities to turn to the United
Nations for assistance restoring peace and stability. Established under UNSC
Resolution 143 adopted on July 14, 1960, the United Nations Operations in the
Congo, known through its French acronym ONUC (Organisation/Operations des
Nations Unies au Congo), was the first United Nations Peacekeeping Mission of
its kind established by the Security Council (Liu 1999:34), but drew its
principles from those enunciated for UNEF (Findlay 2002:52). ONUC remains one
of the most important missions throughout the history of United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations. It is also one of the most controversial particularly
on aspects related to the use of force. The main source of controversy rose
from the interpretation of mandates and the legalistic approach dictated by the
conformism of UN peacekeeping principles inherited from previous peacekeeping
missions, and the evolutionary approach demonstrated by Dag Hammarskjold, then Secretary-General
of the Organization (Abi-Saab 1978:39-44). Of the two contending approaches,
the former wished to stick to the strict application of the principle of the
use of force only as a last resort in self-defense; the latter promoted an
evolution of the concept of use of force and that of self-defense. The use of
force and the concept of self-defense in United Nations peacekeeping operations
radically changed, thanks to ONUC (Liu 1999:34).

This
paper will focus on the aspect surrounding the use of force on the legalistic
angle, the respect of the mandate, hierarchical instructions and directives
related to the use of force in ONUC. Given the importance of the Katanga in this
respect, the spatial circumscription of this discussion will be limited to this
province during the period from 1960 to 1964. The main point of this discussion
will be “whether or not operations in Katanga were a consequence of
civilian and military insubordination”. In order to determine the eventuality
of civilian or military insubordination there is a need to analyze different
mandates over the use of Force in the Katanga and its direct impact on
the course of the mission.

The
motivation behind the choice of United Nations Force (UNF) in the Katanga for this
discussion lies, as mentioned above, in its importance on the evolution of the
Concept of Peacekeeping Operations and particularly on the burning subject of
the recourse to force to implement a particular aspect of the mandate. The
Katangan secession seems the choice of predilection for the study of
peacekeeping and peace enforcement under the UN banner. The great share of
ONUC’s legacy on the evolution of peacekeeping operations would be attributed
to operations in Katanga.

 

 

 

I. The Independence of the Congo and the Chaos

In 1885 at the Conference in Berlin, King Leopold II was able to obtain recognition for the Association Internationale Africaine or the International Association for Africa (IAA), the sovereignty equal to that of an independent state. The IAA gave way in 1885 to Congo Free State. Since the beginning of the colonization of the Congo in 1876, it was a private property of King Leopold II until 1908, year that knew the transfer of ownership to the Kingdom of Belgium. During the Leopoldian ownership, the management of the Congo was made, initially through the Association Internationale Africain, then Congo Free State and the Compagnie du Katanga. A district of the Lualaba covering the territory of future Katanga, was established in 1888 as part of the Congo Free State. As the Free State didn't however have the financial and human ressources to colonize the new territory its administration and exploitation was entrusted in 1891 to the Compagnie du Katanga. In 1900 the Company's rule was replaced by that of a new agency, the Comité Spécial du Katanga - CSK, including representatives of the Free State and of the Compagnie du Katanga and enjoying - like the Company - full administrative and economic powers[2]. The CSK was a distinct authority from the Congo Free State. In 1910 the CSK lost its administrative powers and Katanga was integrated into the Belgian Congo as a vice government general, retaining a large measure of autonomy (Ibid). The Vice-Governor General directly reported to Brussels and the Katanga enjoyed its special autonomy until 1933 when it was reorganized as a province within the Belgian Congo and under the authority of the central government (Lemarchand 1962). 

Immediately after
independence in 1960, the Congo
faced:

a. The mutiny
of the army (troops requested more pay and access to higher ranks),

b. The
epidemic rise of tribal and rebellious movements[3] ( most of political
Parties had tribal foundations),

c. The incapacity
of the Government to restore and maintain law and order within its territory,

d. The Katangan
secession (11 July 1960), and

e. Misunderstanding
of the process of transfer of authority from Belgians to Congolese nationals – mostly
due to lack of preparedness (James 1996: 20-21).

The lack of preparedness was a logical consequence of Belgium’s paternalistic colonial approach which
mainly suggested taking care of basic needs of Congolese in order to keep them happy
without giving them voice in the administration of the res publica and the lack of elite for continuity. At Independence, average of
Congolese university graduates was between14 to 31 out of an estimated
population of 14.000.000 (Ibid).

The collapse
of law and order emphasized by rivalry of President Joseph Kasavubu and his
Prime Minister P.E. Lumumba, apparently motivated by tribal pressure (Epstein
1965: 9-12). This led to internal tensions, aggravated at the international
level by the presence of Belgian troops assimilated by the Social and Communist
block, led by USSR
to an [NATO’s] invasion of a sovereign State, threatening to intervene in order
to “end the aggression”. This position was dictated by socialist obedience of
P.M. Lumumba. At this point, a direct confrontation between the USA and the USSR
in the Congo
became a very strong possibility. The recourse to the UN was the only solution
to avoid a East-West war in the Congo.
ONUC’s intervention had the credit of avoiding of direct military confrontation
of the two superpowers (USA
and USSR)
on the Congolese ground.

II. Genesis
and deployment ONUC

The
major difficulty for the Congolese government remained the secession of the
richest province declared by Moise Kapenda Tshombe, leader of the CONAKAT.
Officially, the secession was to preserve Katanga
from the fallout that the rest of the Congo faced. This secession meant
evasion of revenue from the important mineral exploitation represented by the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) and
a precedent for other provinces to secede from the central government, and
consequently the total balkanization of the Congo. In order to save the state
from a predicted end, P.E. Lumumba called on the United Nations for assistance
in order to restore peace and order. To respond to the request from the
government of the Congo, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold submitted a request
to the Security Council, invoking, for the first time in the history of the
United Nations, Chapter XV, article 99 of the UN Charter for discussions (Findlay
2002:52). The invocation of article 99 meant that discussions in the Security
Council would be based upon the opinion of the Secretary-General on what
represents a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. In
the case of the Congo,
Hammarskjold based his judgment on the fear that the two Cold War antagonists
and their allies and proxies would be drawn into the escalating cauldron
(Ibid.). This gamble determined the cleverness that characterized Hammarskjold.
It also circumscribed the discussions to his point of view. Another reason for
the invocation of article 99 (Chapter XV) avoided Chapter VII as wished by USSR (Citrin
1996: 31-45).

Using
Peacekeeping principles drawn from UNEF, Hammarskjöld designed a Peacekeeping
Mission that would include, for the first time in the history of Peacekeeping
Operations (PKOs), simultaneously Military and Civilian components and would be
under SG’s supervision. ONUC became the first PKOs established by UNSC and
equally the first multi-dimensional PKOs in the history of the UN. Following
principles copied from UNEF would be guidelines (Findlay 2002: 52-53). ONUC Should:

– Be present with consent of the Government of the Congo

– should not take any action susceptible of making it
party to the internal conflict,

– Be under exclusive command of UN and not the
Congolese Government,

– Enjoy freedom of movements and communications
necessary for its operations (agreement to arranged with the Congolese
government),

– Use force only as a last resort, restricted to
self-defense only, and UN forces should avoid taking military initiatives.

Established under UNSC resolution 143/1960, ONUC’s Initial
Mandate was to bring about the withdrawal of Belgian Forces from the Congo, and, as
in UNEF, it should fill the gap left by the departing foreign Armed Forces. A
special feature, inexistent in Egypt
with UNEF, appeared in the situation in Congo, is that the disintegrated armed
forces could not be able to take over the control of Law and Order. For this
reason and UN forces would have to fill the gap. Without clear mandate, this
task seemed unrealistic, i.e. the UN assistance to the Government of Congo had
no practical stand, given the fact that troops  did not know what to do on the ground to bring
this assistance (Findlay 2002:52). UN troops ended up doing police and the Force Publique’s jobs. ONUC remains
one of the speediest deployed UN missions (Ibid). Troops arrived from Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea,
Ireland, Liberia, Mali,
Morocco, Sweden and Tunisia,
deployed in all provinces, except in Katanga (Ibid.)

III. The Katangan Secession

Settlement processes in the province were initiated under the auspices
of a quasi-independent entity, the Comite Special du Katanga – CSK (Lemarchand 1962). The autonomy enjoyed by Katanga until 1933, resembling to that of the
Ruanda-Urundi, gave an impression of this province being distinct from the rest
of the Congo.
Another fact to support this position is the endowment in Minerals, which made
the Katanga an economic
power and the most developed province within the Congo. The UMHK, which comprised
British and Belgian interests, was in itself, a power to count on, given its
Public Information structures which went far beyond the measure of the Congo as a
State. Settlers in Katanga
tried to get the Government in Brussels to
create an independent state in Katanga,
which would remain under their dominion even after independence. After failing
to obtain the backing from Brussels,
they allied with the Confederation des
Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT), which represented the interest
of the authentic Katangese community.
This community was struggling to restore the balance broken by the introduction
of the alien tribes – the baluba of Kasai (Lemarchand 1962). Allying with European settlers
who shared the fear of losing their interests seemed a genuine cause for the
CONAKAT (Ibid.). It appears that foreign interests coupled to political
aspirations of Katangese political authorities decided the fate of the Congo, which
seemed a nonviable child born from the independence. The way for a secession of
Katanga
was already paved; the only missing element was a trigger. The mutiny of the
Force Publique was the long expected opportunity for the CONAKAT. After its
materialization, the secession of Katanga
represented a very big challenge to the survival of the Congo and a
threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, at least in the
context of opposing international interests dictated by the Cold War.

IV. Considerations
over the Secession.

From
the onset of the mission, Hammarskjöld’s approach on the Katangan secession was
cautious. This implied that the UN viewed the situation as a constitutional disagreement
outside its jurisdiction (House, 1978: 124; Abi-Saab, 1978: 39, 44). It justified
UN’s non-interference with domestic matters as a marker of its impartiality. This
approach and the diplomacypromoted by Hammarskjold led to acceptance of initial
troops in Katanga.
The shift from the cautious and diplomatic approach appeared, most probably
because of tragic events that happened in the course of the mission, especially
the death of the most respected United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG), Dag
Hammarskjöld.

Other
reasons that led to the change of the UN’s perception over Katanga’s claim for independence were apparently
interests of International actors with the USA as coalition leader. One of the
fundamental requirements for recognition of claims for self-determination is
the freedom from interference from another government in internal domestic
affairs. This particular aspect could not be satisfied in the case of the
Katangan secession, as to mean international interests crippled the claim for
independence from Congo.
The late US
advocacy for the end of the secession was not for reasons related to
International peace and security (Weissman, 1974: 152-194), but most probably
found its explanation in International Intelligence Strategy. Supporting the end
of the secession, the USA
feared of an intrusion of Communists and/or the USSR Troops in assistance to
the Congolese Government. This fear was perceptible in the of Assistant
Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland’s statement on operations in Katanga, on January
17, 1963 (Lefever 1963:85):

”…the
UN action in Katanga was justified, even though it was opposed in varying degrees
by several of the larger nations because of operations in the Congo, there are
no uninvited foreign troops, no communist enclaves, no army of Liberation, no
reason for a single American soldier to die there, no excuse for a soviet
soldier to live there”.

 

The USA, as mentioned above, considered that the
continuation of the secession could lead to the collapse of the Central
Government with direct consequence being the end of the Congo as a unified State and instability of Africa (Weissman, 1974: 152-194). Katanga has always been the biggest contributor
to the national budget, thus its secession asphyxiated the economy of the Congo. The other
reason was the possibility that other provinces would secede from the Congo and
complicate furthermore the crisis. For this reason, it was imperious [for the USA] to end the secession for the sake of the
Congolese unity and the stability of Africa. Difficulties
to re-integrate Katanga
were deep in respect to the presence of mercenaries and the financial support
of the UMHK, a state within the State and the “Economic Lung[4]” of the State. Once this
secession ended, it could be easy to handle the other rebellious and
secessionist movements, especially that of the Lumubist Gizenga. Some
possibility of economic interests justified this position. It is believed that
American-Swedish interest dictated Hammarkjold’s actions and US position on Katanga (Rosio
1993).

Earlier,
the UNSC considered Katangan secession[5] a purely internal matter, as
stressed in the UNSC Resolution 146[6] and it was meant to be
settled between Central Government and Katanga Provincial authorities without
any international interference. It [UNSC] focused its attention on the
withdrawal of foreign Troops and the maintenance of law and order. The only
role the UN could play in this case was to create conditions for negotiations
and play the good offices role. Nevertheless, Dag Hammarskjöld’s tragic death on
the way to resolve the Katangan issue might have significantly changed this
perception, and the secession, finally, was the qualified illegal “illegal”[7]. Resolution 169 of
November 24, 1961 clearly gave UNSC’s view over the secession without any ambiguity.
USSR’s
position was very much clear from the beginning as it shared Lumumba’s
socialist views. Soviets Socialists strongly disapproved the Katangan
secession.

V. Legal
bases on the use of Force in the Katanga

Before
discussing the use of force in Katanga,
it is important to mention the difficulties encountered by the UN to deploy its
troops in the breakaway province. Despite its fast deployment, ONUC was not
able to penetrate Katanga.
Secessionist authorities opposed the presence of UN forces in Katanga, In order to implement Resolution 146
(S/4426), UNSG Hammarskjöld conducted difficult negotiations leading to an acceptance,
under conditions, of the entry of the UN in the Katanga. His tacit acceptance of
conditions laid by Tshombe, in order to allow UNF deployment in the Katanga,
led to hardship between him and Prime Minister Lumumba. In fact, Lumumba feared
an authentication and acceptance of the Katangan secession, despite the fact
that this implicit acceptance was based upon hypothetical and undefined
relations to take place between Katangan authorities and the UN (Abi-Saab, G.,
1978: 45). In the spirit of Resolution 146, ONUC’s deployment in the Katanga was
mandatory and was legitimate.

ONUC’s
field operations in the Katanga and elsewhere in the Congo were based upon the
mandate formulated in a set of Resolutions, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) of
Peacekeeping Force and Secretary-General’s directives[8]. These directives were
summaries of mandates and peacekeeping principles. The other legal base for the
use of force is the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) signed between the UN and
the Government of the Congo.
The first SOFA was signed at the beginning of deployments in July 1960, but its
provision did not contain any use of force. A second SOFA was later signed in
November 1961, with retroactive effect from the deployment, it contained
provisions on the use of force as a last resort in case of self defense and
within limits of its mandate. The  signature
of the second SOFA was to conform to resolution 169 voted three days earlier,
consecrating enforcement measures, especially against the Katangan secession.
UNSC resolutions 161 and 169 constituted also the legal base that justified
UN’s recourse to forceful means to settle the Katangan issue.

Although
they constituted the legal base for the use of force, resolutions 161 and 169,
as political decisions, were subject to different interpretations. For those
that advocated ONUC’s use of force from the beginning, Resolution 146, on its
own, contained provisions of the use of force, but, Dag Hammarskjöld, wishing
peaceful settlement of the crisis than showdown, rejected this interpretation.
The second interpretation found its justification in Secretary-General’s
recourse to article 99, which indirectly invoked Chapter VII, particularly
article 39. However, Katanga
supporters, including some western chancelleries  rejected reasons evoked by Officials to
justify the recourse to the use of force to end the secession. They depicted it
as the “finality” in itself rather
than a consequence of enforcement measures against foreign troops and
self-defense.

In
general, Security Council resolutions are results of painful political
negotiations among international actors, especially the five permanent members
of the UNSC. Each actor makes sure to secure interests of his state, making
sometimes mandates practically impossible to implement in field of operations,
either because they are insufficient or impracticable. The case of the Congo did not
escape from this principle.

The
first provision to be explored is the concept of self-defense. Traditional
self-defense provision authorized peacekeeper use force to protect from direct harmful
attack. Die to necessity, the concept was extended in order to fit the
situation in the field. From this new approach, self-defense would comprise
peacekeeper’s personal protection from attack, imminent attack; the same
applying to civilian under the protection of peacekeeping forces. Self-defense,
in the spirit of ONUC, would include disarmament and detention, pending deportation.
The second provision concerned the use of force to restore freedom of the
movement of the UNF guaranteed by the SOFA agreement. This provision, never
used before appeared in operations in Katanga, though it generated many
protestations because of circumstances surrounding these operations. Besides
this procedural framework, any decision regarding the use of force had to be
sanctioned by the UNSG or his delegate. It appears clearly, that UNSG’s
directives gave a hierarchical chain which was to be scrupulously respected
whenever the question of the use of force appeared. The management of
day-to-day operations in PKOs was UNSG’s responsibility. He was accountable to
the UNSC for PKOs, thus critical decisions belonged to him. It is in the light
of the hierarchy and procedures and binding texts and directives that the
following analysis will dissect events and mechanisms that surrounded
enforcement measures and operations surrounding that sealed the fate of the
Katangan secession.

 

 

 

VI. Enforcement
Measures in Katanga
and the End of the Secession

After
difficult negotiations, UN Forces deployed and started implementing the mandate
within the Katanga.
Their mandate included among the others, the apprehension and expulsion of
foreign and ‘uninvited’ troops, maintaining law and order and the prevention of
civil war. This exercise was not easy for a number of reasons among which
prevailed, on the Katangan side, the fear of the end of the secession followed
by the end of financial privileges mercenaries enjoyed, and the fact that peacekeepers
were perceived as invaders allied to the Central Government. Given the
enormous difficulty to deliver their UNF
resorted to the use of force a number of times, but in the following lines it
will be question of four times major operations in the Katanga. The question of
the use of force in Katanga
constitutes the main part of this discussion, not as such, but considering the
conformism characterizing the conduct of operations and chain of command in
UNPKOs and, particularly ONUC, i.e. respect of the mandate, operational
procedures and hierarchical procedures. The main question the following
paragraphs will discuss is the whether or not the planning and conduct of
enforcement measures in Katanga were acts of insubordination and how they did
affect the credibility of United Nations in general and peacekeeping operations
in particular.

In Katanga, UNF
conducted four major operations in order to implement ONUC’s mandate. These
operations were known as:

– Operation Rum Punch;

– Operation Morthor;

– Operation UNOKAT;

– Operation Grand Slam.

a. Round
One: Operation Rumpunch

Known as Operation Rumpunch, the first operation was
an enforcement of UNSC resolution 161/1961. The operation started on August 28,
1961 and was conducted in order to arrest and expel all foreign military and
political advisors believed to be those preventing Tshombe from engaging into negotiations
for peaceful settlement of the secession. Operation Rumpunch began with ‘preventive measures’ justifiable, according
to ONUC, under the force’s right of self-defence and its mandate to prevent
civil war (Findlay
2002:73).

Operation
Rumpunch did not directly aim the end the secession with coercive measures, but
isolating secessionist authorities from foreign military and political strategists.
In doing so, UN authorities expected to persuade Tshombe and his cabinet to
negotiate and possibly obtain the reunification of the Congo as a whole.
Despite the great caution that characterized Operation Rumpunch, it provoked a series of protests from Britain, Belgium
and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as well as other Katanga supporters
in the West. It is important to note that UN weak Public Information did not
help in inverting the tendency. It was unable to compete with the  heavily paid pro-Katanga media-press that
western public opinion informed and in favor of Katanga. Consequently, UN
operations were considered as a form of subjugation the only “stable” and
anti-communist province of the Congo.

 However, the original plan for this operation sanctioned
by the Secretary-General underwent changes. Some of the new operational aspects
were not discussed with the hierarchy prior to their implementation. According
to UN authorities in the Congo,
these modifications were meant to be pre-emptive actions to minimize bloodshed
(Rikhye, 1995: 255, 259). They implied the capture of the radio station, the
post and telecommunications office as well as isolation of Munongo[9], by besieging his house
and isolating him from foreign mercenaries (Ibid).

Considering
the UN’s chain of command and the approval system on sensitive operations, the
three new aspects of Rum Punch, even though they were operational details and
not noticeable from the outside, were questionable, i.e. they were not done in
accordance with given instructions. They could only be justified in a case of
emergency. Obnubilated details of the
operation would have represented a problem in case of complications. The fact
that no attention was paid to these details possibly meant a “chèque en blanc” (blanket authority) given
to UN officials in the Katanga
at the heights of the tension, and would explain steps taken for the next
operation.

Rumpunch
met no resistance from the Gendarmerie
until instruction to halt the operation were given, apparently upon demand of
consular representatives[10] in Katanga, who promised
to conduct the grouping and expelling of their nationals. Overall, Operation
Rumpunch would be seen as a success because of the inexistence of casualties on
both sides, including civilians, its effectiveness on the purpose and its
length in time, even if it was not complete (Findlay, 2002: 73-74). This success was due
to its detailed preparation, co-ordination of UN Contingents as well as the surprise
effect over the Katangan Gendarmerie
and mercenaries (Rikhye,1993:255,259).

The striking
element on Rumpuch was ONUC’s provision of a guard of honor for the Belgian
officers being expelled from Katanga;
this action was qualified as foolish and inappropriate comic opera exhibition by Hammarskjöld (ibid). So long as the
Katangan secession was qualified illegal (UNSC Res. 161/1961), any action
conducted in this context was, ipso facto,
illegal and its acting agents were liable to prosecution concerning their
action in conformity with the Congolese and International Laws. Although, the
UN had no judicial mandate to prosecute such individuals, at least the approach
taken in this regard should relay UN’s disapproval and of foreign support to
secession. A guard of honor to these individuals showed a complete reversal
from drastic measures against mercenaries to a tacit acquiescence, and
consequently, lack of efficiency and complaisance on the part of the UN.  

On the legalistic side, Operation Rumpuch was fully
justified by Resolution 161. It
remained within the limits of ONUC Mandate. However, the conduct of operations
breached the principle of impartiality of peacekeepers. Though it did not attempt,
at least officially, to suppress the secession, eliminating foreign elements
constituted a support to the central government in the restoration of the
territorial integrity and the political independence of the Congo. Finally,
Operation Rumpuch and other consecutive UN operations in Katanga clearly indicated that the UN’s actions
would affect the political settlement of an internal and constitutional dispute
between the central government and the breakaway province – Katanga. Thus
UN’s non-interference in domestic affairs, as far as the Congo was
concerned was no longer applicable. Operation Rumpunch was successfully
conducted without bloodshed, rounding up, arresting and expelling mercenaries
gave satisfaction to the UN. The timely and well prepared coordination of the
operation obnubilated protests that rose from its conduct, particularly from Katanga
supporters.

b.  Round One
Continued: Operation Morthor[11]

The success of Rumpunch galvanized Connor Cruise O’Brien (UN
representative in Katanga)
to plan operation Morthor, as he believed the Gendarmerie Katangaise was weakened
by Operation Rumpunch. Operation was more controversial and it darkened
the whole image of ONUC’s operations. The rationale behind Operation Morthor
was to replicate of Operation Rumpunch – bis and to finalize what the
unfinished task (Boulden 1999). Conditions were different from Rumpunch to
Morthor. The surprise effect would no longer work. Other aspects related to the
planning and the co-ordination between different Contingents in the core of the
action, and the Katangan resistance was minimized. It was a total
miscalculation. If Operation Rumpunch could be viewed as a success due to rapid
results it brought, Morthor displayed a total misconception and lack of
co-ordination with major damages. It is important to notice that the Katangan
Gendarmerie were better equipped and great in number than UNF.

Launched
on September 12 without prior approval of Hammarskjold, 1961, Operation Morthor
intended to arrest and expel foreign uninvited troops, but most of all, to
arrest secessionist authorities, with the exception of Tshombe and end the
secession of Katanga (Findlay 2002:75, McDonald 2001). O’Brien tried to
persuade Tshombe that his only way out for him was to surrender and liquidate
the secession, while UNF would take the radio station, the Post Office and
Offices of the Surete (McDonald 2001). The conduct of the operation was
apparently unknown from the Secretariat. Hammarskjöld got informed about it
only upon his transit in Accra on his way to
Leopoldville through news, but the amplification given to Katanga from
international press made him take it with less importance. The kept Force
Commander was also in complete blackout as to the planning of the operation. At
this point, the question of Area Commander (Brigadier Raja) integrity and
professionalism surfaced. Military are known to be respectful of the hierarchy
and the chain of command than civilian. Whether or not instructions on
Operation Morthor emanated from UNSG, as pretended during the preparatory
meeting convened by Khiary, Brigadier Raja has the duty to consult his
superior, in fact the Force Commander, so as not to break the rigid UN chain of
command (Urquhart, 1972: 548-9).

At the end of this operation, central government
flags were supposed to be raised on all official buildings and an official from
Leopoldville was expected to assume authority
on behalf of the central government. Unexpectedly, the operation met early and
sustained resistance from the Gendarmerie. Instead of taking Katangan forces by
surprise, UNF were taken by surprise (Findlay
2002:75). After agreeing to O’Brien’s conditions, Tshombe fled to Northern Rhodesia. O’Brien prematurely declared the end
of the secession. Events surrounding Operation Morthor led to the crash of
Hammarskjold’s plane in Ndola, while on his way
to negotiate the resolution of the crisis in Katanga (Boulden 1999, Findlay
2002:76, McDonnald 2001). Both parties – UNF and the Gendarmerie – suffered
heavy casualties, the Katangan side being seriously affected. Additional to
casualties, Irish troops were under siege in Jadotville.

On the public information register, the UN’s
credibility was, furthermore, damaged. It was no longer question of peacekeeping
operations, but a peace enforcement mission, which Hammarskjold was trying to
avoid from the beginning (Findlay
2002:75). With this shift on peace support operations, the UN was facing
further pressure from Troop Contributing Countries and the public international
opinion. In fact, allegations of attacks on civilian property, ambulances and
hospitals were reported all over the world.

An
important fact to be mentioned in the understanding of the role of the UN in
the Congo and the interpretation of resolutions in regard to the growing
inflammatory and volatile situation in Katanga from both UN actors and the
Central government of the Congo. This misunderstanding had governed the
relationship between both of them throughout mission lifetime, especially when
it came to the Katangan secession. The Government, based upon the fact that it
had invited in the UN, believed the latter would act upon its request to end
the secession. UN’s position (at least in Hammarskjold’s perspective) was to
refrain from interfering in internal matters (the Katangan case was believed to
be one) and stick to the principles of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
(Abi-Saab: 39-44). The development of the situation would hardly help the UN
keeping these principles.

The
other fact to mention in this operation was the personality of individuals at UN
leadership level in the Congo
that affected their judgment of the situation on the ground. Individuals whose
personalities affected the conduct of UN operations in the Congo were Dag Hammrskjold, UNSG, Mahmood
Khiary, Chief of Civilian Operations in Congo,
Connor Cruise O’Brien, UN representative in Katanga, and Brigadier Raja from
the Indian Contingent. The personality of Dag Hammarskjold would not be part of
this section. Mahmoud Khiary, Chief of Civilian Operations at the time of
Operation Morthor, was a Tunisian national with strong nationalistic views. The
description provided by Rikhye[12] depicted a man “having no
patience with the maneuvering of the Belgians to retain dominance over an
independent country and he was intolerant to people like Tshombe and Kalonji
who looked to the Belgians to remain on power…” From this depiction, it is
clear that his personal views overweighed tact, diplomacy and strategy. His understanding of the UN peace and
security was limited to his Congo
experience (Rikhye 1995:260-261).
The decision he took in authorizing Morthor had a serious impact on the mission
and would change the course of history. Hammarskjöld’s death would be
considered one of the heaviest consequences of this misconceived operation.

Connor
Cruise O’Brien a was spontaneous individual and sometimes lacking continence
and was not a man in the Katanga’s
burning situation; this justified the reserve given by Frank Aiken[13] regarding his appointment
in the Elisabethville (Urquhart, 1972: 548-9).
He was an outstanding politician and diplomat, but with less experienced with
the UN. He was flamboyant and spontaneous and sometime this would go beyond the
limits of his authority. His temperament and background did not fit for Elisabethville (Ibid). Counting the number of times he was
quoted by the press and media using a controversial discourse over UN’s
presence and operations in the Congo,
especially in times the Organization had a crippled Public Information Aiken’s
reserves upon him could be justified. All this kept Hammarskjöld apprehensive
of his state of mind (Ibid.). The next
key person was Brigadier Raja[14] who had no experience in
Peacekeeping operations. As a trained military, he was to resort what he was trained to do – the use of force (Rikhye 1995: 260-1).

These
three key persons would be ready to bend the rules to achieve their goal, or
what they thought was UN’s. The common features among them were (1) the
inexperience in the United Nations diplomacy and the way of handling crises at
the height of the Cold War and (2) the anti-colonialist conviction.  A highly sensitive mission over which
antagonism grew between the West and East needed diplomats who were able to
transcend their personal convictions and foresee impacts of their decision long
term. Unfortunately, the aforementioned officials did not demonstrate this
quality.  

Morthor
showed ONUC had clearly gone even the extended perception of self-defense in
PKOs and entered Peace Enforcement Operations without any mandate. Noticing the
massive use of force and its lack of approval, this operation tarnished the
image of the UN Operations and mobilized protests from members of the UN and
its condemnation by international Medias (Findlay:76). O'Brien’s declaration that Katanga was back
under the Central Government’s control, and his justification that Morthor was
conducted under provisions enumerated in paragraph A1 of Resolution 161, which
he thought authorized ONUC to use force to end the secession (to prevent civil
war), showed a clear shift from fundamental principles of peacekeeping as
elaborated by Hammarskjold and highlighted in Resolutions 143 and 146. Was it a
violation of these principles or a policy change? Although Dag Hammarskjöld rejected
these claims and presented the operation as a continuation of Rumpunch, aimed
at the rounding up and expulsion of foreign military personnel (McDonnald
2001), facts on the ground contradicted his statements. Many factors clearly
evidenced that Morthor was an attempt to end the Katangan secession and the
legalistic approach of Hammarskjöld prevented him from supporting such move
there was no legal basis to justify it.  Neither
the mandate, nor any other fundamental or operational document did cover it. To
end the secession by forcible means was ultra
vires the UN mandate (Ibid).

In
spite of its ex-post factum justification
with the vote of Resolution 169 November 24, 1961, Morthor marked a switch from
Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement without any justification and de facto changing the Rules of
Engagement (ROE) of UN forces in Congo. On the other side, it could
be considered as a disaster for none of its objectives was achieved and it
resulted in an increased number of casualties from both sides, Tshombe and
Munongo could not be apprehended, and mercenaries remained. The great loser of
this operation were the UN including the fact that claims were received
concerning UN peacekeepers respect of the Geneva Conventions and the customary
Laws of war during hostilities; tarnishing the image of the Organization.

Briefly,
the risk taken by the trio (khiary, O’Brien and Raja) was considerable and
their perception of UN’s functions in the Katanga was a major factor. Trying
to execute warrant arrest issued by the Central Government or ending the
secession was beyond ONUC mandate that, authorized peacekeepers to use force only
as a last resort. Executing warrant from the Central Government
constituted an interference in internal matters breaching the principle of
impartiality fundamental to UN peacekeeping operations. This move was against
Hammarskjöld’s policy in the Congo.
He rejected any action that would affect the balance of power between the
conflicting parties in the Congo
– notably the central government and Katangan secessionist authorities. Therefore,
operation Morthor could no more be accepted as self-defense, even after
stretching in all directions existing Security Council resolutions and summary
directives. Moreover, its main controversy related to the military
initiative and all surrounding factors such as ignorance of the chain of
command and the questionable legitimacy of the use of force to end of the
Katangan secession as confirmed by O’Brien in his declaration at this effect. Resolution
161/1961 paragraph A-1 authorized the UN to take all measures to prevent
occurrence of civil war and not the end of the secession; UN did not have such
mandate at that time.

However,
it would have not been easy to have a normal reaction without infringing basic
principles and procedures of peacekeeping operations in situations like those
of Katanga.
Katanga
was a difficult position where politics, international relations, international
law and experience preceded any action. In addition, Katanga became the focus of UN
military activities and heavy pressure was on UN officials at international, national
and provincial levels. Harassed by the Katangan Gendarmerie, vilified by Katangan
authority and their sympathizers, and hindered in their plans by Western
consuls, some mistakes would always to be expected, but their unfortunate cost was
the loss of the greatest UN Secretary-General.

c. Round two: Operation UNOKAT

The failure
of Morthor and consecutive negotiations
to end hostilities left Katangan authorities boosted with pride and the feeling
of victory, they regained confidence, and his minister of interior, Munongo,
resumed his negative propaganda against ONUC (Rikhye 1995:287). Consequently,
harassment and attacks on UN personnel re-appeared. After fruitless warning,
the UN had to take another move to restore the freedom of movement of UNF[15] and stop the harassment
of UN member and attacks on IDPs, mainly the Balubas. After considering the
situation, U Thant instructed the Indian Brigadier Raja through Sean MacEeon[16] to “use all troops at his
disposal to restore law and order, and to achieve that, he had to use all force
necessary” (Findlay 2002: 78).  

Indeed,
the instruction received by Brigadier Raja expressed the change of UN policy
regarding the use of force possibly due to the shock that the Organization suffered
with the death of Hammarskjöld when trying to solve the Katanga issue
and partly due to the change of UNSG. This operation consecrated the
inauguration of the stronger mandate voted during November 1961. The use of
force in this operation was greater than all previous operations as the Field
Commander (Raja) had blanket instruction that any other before and after him
could have had (Findlay 2002: 78). Allegations of a hidden agenda on forcing
political decisions by force and weakening position of a party to the Conflict
(Katanga)
to persuade it to negotiate were brought about concerning this operation.

In
fact, this operation, examined on the military and political angle, would be
qualified successful, by neutralizing the Katangan air force assets (fixed and
rotary wing aircrafts), especially the famous fouga magister jet fighter. It constituted an essential strike to
the Katangan morale by crashing down elements which symbolized its military
supremacy over ‘peace soldiers’. On the other hand it had restored the freedom
of movement of UNF by removing road blocks and permitting UN Troops to regain
power over the gendarmes. On its own, this operation’s military success
represented the decisive step over the secession and sealed the future of its
actors. On the political ground, UN success over the gendarmes persuaded
Tshombe to meet Adoula and, later, both of them signed the Kitona declaration.
Military success over the Katangan Gendarmerie had sealed the fate of the
self-proclaimed province-state.

Despite
its irreproachable planning and co-ordination, some issues need to be pointed
out as they had marked the conduct of Operation Onukat. First, the freedom of
movement provisions were not enforced. Thus, the use of force to restore
freedom of movement to peacekeepers was not covered by the actual mandate of
ONUC. Second, UNF compliance to provisions of the International Humanitarian
Law on targeting civilian and military objectives and specially hospitals,
ambulances and ICRC vehicles presumably due to treachery and perfidy performed
by the Gendarmes, using ambulances and ICRC vehicles and the use of hospitals
and civilian residences to fire or direct fire against UNF (Rikhye 1995: 96).

Some critics
consider that the operation had the purpose of ending the secession using the
backdoor of self-defense (Findlay, 1999: 122), argument denied by George Ivan
Smith[17], whereas others claim,
just as for operation Morthor, it went beyond the borderline separating
peacekeeping to peace enforcement (Rikhye, 1993, 297). Nevertheless, this last
allegation depended on the interpretation of UNSC resolution 169, which had
enforcement measures. And there is no clear practical delineation between
peacekeeping with enforcement measures and peace enforcement.

d. Round three: Operation Grand Slam

In the
volatile situation, tension grew very high during the last quarter of 1962 and
Katangan Gendarmerie were conducting acts of provocation and political leaders
multiplied negative propaganda against UN and calling for general fighting
against UN Force. UN personnel and property were subject to recurrent attacks
from the gendarmes after talks between Tshombe and Adoula had failed due to
lack of commitment of the former. The last resort was the use of coercive
measures to end the secession for the sake of unity and international peace.
Gendarmes preferred fighting against the UN rather than re-integrating the Congo, they
even threatened using scorched earth and sabotaging the infrastructure. The
last two weeks of December seemed more difficult due to the Katangan
Gendarmerie increased harassment and firing on UN members, civilians and
military. Further warnings were issued to Tshombe about reprisal measures from
UNF if these attacks continued, but this did not work out.

The operation
started on December 28, 1962 and ended January 21 with entry of UN troops in Kolwezi, 300 Kilometers
north-West of Elizabethville. Meanwhile, Tshombe had capitulated and announced
the end of Katanga Secession January 17, 1963 after his defeat. Operation Grand
Slam was presumably a self-defense action against repeated attacks against UN
troops and civilian personnel and it was conducted that context.

This
version became questionable after the entry of troops into Jadotville, 120 Kilometers
North of Elizabethville, ignoring U Thant[18] assurances that troops
would halt and would not cross the Lufira
River[19]. UN official report
concluded Communication breakdown from UNHQ, Leopoldville,
and Elizabethville due to time difference. After troops had crossed the river,
it was difficult to evoke the self-defense justification, thus the invocation
of the freedom of movement provisions. However, as mentioned above, this
justification was questionable on the legal basis, in relation to the mandate. 

Conclusion

Of
course, ONUC remains one of the most important missions beyond traditional
conception of Peacekeeping operations; it was the first multifunctional mission
comprising both the military and civilian component. It also remains one of the
largest UN Peacekeeping Missions ever deployed and operations in Congo marked the
evolution in the concept of use of force and that of self-defense. However,
behind this evolution and success, some black spots remained. At what cost did
the UN operate these important changes in peacekeeping operations? The cost of
these changes was too high. ONUC intervention in the Congo was to assist the government
to restore law and order and arrange conditions for the settlement of internal
and constitutional disagreements. The operations in the Congo, in general and
those in Katanga in particular, were marked by critical incidents principally
based upon the interpretation of mandates, understanding of the role of the UN
in the Congo and the conduct of operations in the field, thus casting a
negative image on an operation that had brought revolution on the way the world
community handles conflicts today.

In the
history of the evolution of UN peace support operations, Katanga will
always occupy a place of choice. This place of choice is of Katanga in this
respect is due to three essential factors. The first of all there was a
profound divergence of views regarding the position the UN should adopt vis-à-vis of the secession. Was the
Katangan secession a constitutional and internal dispute or a threat to
international peace and security? Hammarskjold’s position on this issue did not
suffer any ambiguity, it was an internal and constitutional dispute, though
some member states suggested that the UN should use force to end the secession,
arguing that existing provisions of the mandate covered this aspect. O’Brien’s
justification for Operation Morthor indicated that paragraph A1 of Resolution
161/1961 gave UN the possibility of pre-emptive use of force to end the
Katangan secession on the ground that the central government was building up
troops to attack Katanga (McDonnald 2001). Being a threat to international
peace and security or civil war is not the question; the main question is to
know whether or not there grounds for use of force to end the secession. These
grounds had to be drawn from the mandate of ONUC, SOFA and SG’s directives. The
question of legal justification for the use of force to in Katanga is the
second. This makes the second factor. The means and the ends were the third
factor. It was claimed UNF used force to expel foreign troops, restore freedom
of movement, or for self-defens, but O’Brien’s statement made it clear the use
of force was the means and the end was the termination of the secession of Katanga. After
establishing the threat and justifying the actions, the finality of these
actions (use of force) was another subject of controversy.

In all
this embroglio, the behavior of
officials who had the answers to questions raised by the presence of the three
factors was the catalyzing element, have there been all these controversies
without UN authorities bending the rules to satisfy situational pressure, the
impact would have been minimal on the credibility, impartiality and the moral
capital of the UN. After Operation Rumpunch, Dag Hammarskjold issued a summary
instruction to ONUC (See Figure 1). These instructions clarified his position
on the use of force. It appears that ONUC officials did not follow these
instructions as far as Operation Morthor was concerned. To conduct a major
operation without prior clearance from the hierarchy and in total contradiction
with instructions received. It is a policy within the UN to confirm any
instruction in case of doubt from the hierarchy, obviously this had not been
the case for Round One Operation Morthor. This demonstrates a blatant insubordination.

 The fact that UNF in the Congo was a mosaic of
many contingents from different Contributing States who had never worked
together and facing languages communication problems did affect its operations.
On top of the communicational difficulty, autonomy of troops and agreements
between UNHQ and the contributing Member
State brought much
friction among Contingents. This was one of the biggest difficulties in the
conduction of field operations.

ONUC
was conducted with tactical diplomacy by an eminent Secretary-General (Dag Hammarskjöld)
more inclined to resolution of disputes by peaceful means instead of the use of
force and having more consideration on legalistic approach. His untimely death seriously
affected conceptions and the interpretation of Resolutions. His replacement had
less consideration on the legal considerations and wanted the finish the job
quickly (Abi-Saab 1978:196-198). The way the the Katangan secession was ended
highlighted an exasperation and impatience about a situation which was more
than taking long.

Many
elements affected ONUC’s rating:

a. The
failure of the state, which characterized the Congo,

b. The
context of cold war,

c. The misunderstanding
and misinterpretation of principles governing peacekeeping operation,

d. Different
interests of Eastern and Western blocks,

e. The
changing and volatile situation, specially in the Katanga, and finally

f. The quality
of UN leadership in the field.

The
failure of state led to a situation where the UN had to act as a national
police in maintaining law and order, and sometime they were asked to carry duties,
which were beyond the scope of a peacekeeping mission. The lack of
understanding on the side of Congolese authorities was also due to a poor Public
Information to explain UN role and the limitation of its mandate. UN operations
in the Katanga
had been entailed by actions, which were, at different stages, different from
received instructions. Some of these actions claimed lives of peacekeepers,
civilians as well as the Secretary-General. To my humble view, ONUC’s
operations in Katanga
were first experience of a mission of that configuration, combining both
civilian and military component, and in the particular context of Cold War with
too much pressure to handle on a daily basis. Lessons learned from mistakes of
committed in ONUC were bases for reforming peacekeeping operations. These
mistakes and break through in the in the co-ordination at different levels of
responsibility laid a foundation for new concepts of peacekeeping in term of
the use of force and the structure of missions. With UN military action in the Katangan
secession, many question rose, regarding impartiality, peacekeeping and peace
enforcement, the legitimacy of such action, specially the question of the right
to self-determination of a Katangeses. All these are the price paid for the
development of peacekeeping operations within the UN framework.

 

 

 

Abbreviations:

1. IDPs  :
Internal Displaced Populations

2. NATO :
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

3. ONUC : Opération des Nations Unies au Congo

4. PKO   :
Peacekeeping Operation

5. ROE   :
Rule of Engagement

6. UN  :
United Nations

7. UMHK : Union Minière du Haut Katanga

8. UNF  : United Nations Force

9. UNSC :
United Nations Security Council

10.
UNSG : United Nations
Secretary-General

11. US  :
United Stated

12. USSR :
Union of Socialist and Soviet
Republic.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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