10.02.10 Congo Siasa: Interview with Kris Berwouts

 

In a way, Kabila feels
comfortable about the elections. Not because he is popular (he knows he
isn’t) but because there is no real challenger. The MLC has never been
able to get over the departure from the scene of Jean-Pierre Bemba in
March 2007. Tshisekedi’s UDPS has indicated that it wants to take part
in the local elections but did not give much evidence of unity, clear
leadership or the ability to mobilise support now that its chairman is
absent due to his age and poor health. PALU, a member of the ruling
coalition, has also lost its unity after the sidelining of former Prime
Minister Gizenga and the fact that his successor Muzito never could make
any difference. N’Zanga Mobutu has a long-term political capital but
his political movement does not seem to have much potential for
mobilisation outside Equateur Province.

 

Within
the presidential alliance people seem happy in Kabila’s shadow. Olivier
Kamitatu is respected by many and he is considered one of the most
effective ministers but he is not a electoral heavyweight. Today he does
not show great ambitions to offer the electorate any independent
political option. By introducing the debate on changing the constitution
(including a longer mandate and unlimited re-election for the
president), he confirms that he has set his sights on being Prime
Minister by remaining in the presidential camp. Pierre Lumbi’s Movement
for Social Reform (MSR) does not seem very keen to act as an autonomous
party either, and is happy to share power in the margin of the PPRD. The
party, from the time of its inception, was intended to consolidate
loyalty to Kabila in civil society.

 

Vital
Kamerhe seems to have good cards in his hands, although he was forced
to resign as the president of the Parliament in March 2008. On the one
hand the government is aware that there is no credible opposition and
that the regime has no other opponent of his stature, should he wish to
stand. On the other hand, the government is conscious of its own
unpopularity, even in the east where it was elected. It may hope for an
easy re-election, but it will need Kamerhe. Many observers expect that
he will have to choose between setting up his own political party or
rejoining the President’s entourage on terms very favourable to himself
but unpopular with at least one section of the entourage. In either
scenario Kamerhe will play a leading role.

 

 

Kabila of course wants to be
re-elected and counts on his propaganda machinery supported by the
media. His main hope seems to be the acceleration of the implementation
of the Chinese contracts that have to materialise at least a part of the
“cinq chantiers” which were the core of his campaign promises in 2006.

2. It now seems inevitable that the local
elections will be held in 2011. Is this so? Why are these elections
important?

 

EurAc
has always stressed the importance of citizen participation in the
process of national reconstruction. Local elections should have an
essential role in the rehabilitation of governance in the DRC. They are
not only essential to rebuild legitimacy in a state which was
dismembered less than a week after its independence; they are also an
essential element in the development from an embryonic democracy to an
operational one. We consider that the procedure of elections is a kind
of apprenticeship for democracy and will contribute to the renewal of the political landscape
and the emergence of new leadership from the grass roots.

 

However, the local elections are not giving rise to
tremendous enthusiasm, either among the Congolese political elite, or in
the international community, or in the general population. The
government reproaches the international community of being slow to
pledge financial support; the international community reproaches the
Congo government of lacking the political will to organise elections;
and the general population is frustrated because it still is confronted
with the guilty absence of the state. When visiting the embassies, it
becomes obvious that there are countries and international institutions
that do not accord any kind of priority to local elections. But others
are genuinely involved and have already allocated $139 million of the
$163 million that the elections will cost. The countries supporting the
local elections in the Congo expect a clear indication from the Congo
government that it is also committed, including in financial terms.

 

Everybody is wondering whether it is still possible to
organise local elections in a reasonably short time. But the key
question is: is there, behind all the discussion of practicalities and
logistics, enough political will to organise the elections? In the
absence of a strong opposition the current regime feels that its victory
in the 2011 presidential and legislative elections will be easily won.
They see the local elections as one of the rare factors that may disrupt
that outcome. They could provide the space for new or existing
political groups to find a new spring in their step, a new discourse, a
new electorate.

 

3. You also visited the Kivus – what was your impression of the
state of the FDLR after the Kimia II operations?

The
military operations have solved nothing. The FDLR has avoided
confrontation, retreating from its positions and then regaining most of
them, taking revenge on the local Congolese civilians even more
violently than we have seen in recent years. I was shown a letter of the
FDLR command to the different brigades ordering violent action to be
carried out against the Congolese civilian population in order to create
chaos and bring about negotiations with the FDLR. The Commander in
Chief of Kimia II’s euphoric communiqué at the closing ceremony listed
figures of neutralised FDLR fighters but did not mention in the same
detail the price paid by the Congolese population. It also forgets to
say that the FDLR is like a vase that is emptied and refilled at the
same time: some people leave and others join. FARDC deserters coming
from former Mai Mai and Pareco, demobilised FNL fighters, and new
recruits from within Rwanda. The final assessment of Kimia II, given by
its Commander, is that it has reduced the nuisance value of the FDLR but
we strongly doubt that. Their operational capacity is not weakened and
their chain of command remained intact. The military operations
contributed to their radicalisation, as did the arrest of their leaders
in Germany.

 

We
consider the FDLR problem as political, so the solution needs to be
political as well. We have no taboos about a military dimension, but
only when it’s focused, and when it’s part of a broader political
approach. A military solution does not exist. But the chances for a
diplomatic approach to succeed will also depend on Rwanda: today, the
outlook is gloomy as far as democratic participation, guaranteed human
rights and socio-economic opportunities are concerned. Yet if the FDLR
combatants are to return home, they need to be sure that they can live
in future in peace and dignity. A huge stumbling block comes from the
fact that an entire community is blamed for the genocide. The génocidaire label is applied to a whole group and not to individuals.
The only way to make progress on this question is to be more explicit
as to which persons are to blame and of what they are accused.

 

4. Do you feel that any serious steps are
being made, by donors or the Congolese government, to reform the
security services? What are the main obstacles to such reform?

The
Congolese army remains one of the main actors of human rights
violations and still is much more part of the problem then part of the
solution. The reasons are many: there are no caserns to barrack soldiers
and the lack of confidence between the previous rebellions and the
“regular” army still is insurmountable,. The involvement of armed
groups, including the FARDC, in the illegal exploitation of the natural
resources is one of the main obstacles in the security sector reform,
and the army in its present forms gives a lot of opportunities for
corruption and theft. Too much people earn too much money in the grey
zones that exist in the army today.

 

A
lot of efforts have been done and a lot of money spent, but without
results. The creation of a truly unified, effective and disciplined army
is the backbone of lasting security in the eastern Congo. But it is
important that the different international partners involved in the army
reforms manage to work out a better coordinated and complementary
approach, and that a screening mechanism is introduced as a means of
excluding from the army and the police any individuals guilty of human
rights violations, including sexual abuse. Another priority is a working
military tribunal with the courage to judge officers who have committed
abuses, including sexual violence.

5. Is the integration of the CNDP into the
Congolese army sustainable? Has the peace deal between Kigali and
Kinshasa brought a lasting truce, if not necessarily peace, to North
Kivu?

 

A
year after the launch of the military operations, it is clear that they
have not attained their objectives. The CNDP was decapitated by the
arrest of Laurent Nkunda but proper integration into the Congolese state
has not happened. Part of the CNDP never got integrated into the army
and for the part that did the question was: “Who finally integrated
whom?” The result of the integration of the CNDP is that it is larger
than before and that it controls more troops and a greater geographical
area. CNDP’s chain of command still exists. In many parts of Kivu CNDP’s
parallel administration, including road blocks, remains in place, and
its units have gained access to economically interesting places.
Previously, CNDP financially depended on what it was given from various
Rwandan sources, from the business community in Goma and by controlling
imports and exports at the Bunagana frontier post, but the military
operations has given it a grip on one of the most lucrative mineral
areas in the DRC. Still, the movement has been undermining itself
through its disunity. It split into factions which were on several
occasions about to fight each other. Similarly in its civil structure
new men have come and gone.

 

The
Congo and Rwanda began 2009 with a surprise – their rapprochement and
the joint operation. For Kabila as for Kagame, this rapprochement was a
marriage of reason rather than of love: neither of them had other
options. Twelve months later the Congo is weaker: neither the political
institutions of the Third Republic nor the administration function any
better than they did a year ago. Insecurity continues to reign in the
east of the country. Even if the relationship of the forces on the
ground has changed, impunity and the militarisation of the economy
remain as they were. Rwanda, for its part, has quickly recovered from
its moment of weakness and relative isolation. Its participation in a
joint military operation with the Congolese army and its withdrawal
within the due time was seen as a serious indication of good intentions.
Rwanda’s access to minerals and grazing land in Kivu is greater than a
year ago and its ally in the Congo’s politico-military context, the
CNDP, is today in a position it could only dream of a year ago. Rwanda
is once again considered to be a stabilising factor in the region and
this has been confirmed by its acceptance into the Commonwealth (in
spite of a very critical independent report) and by the visit of the
French President to Kigali.

6. What is the mood amongst the important international
actors in Kinshasa? Is there a feeling of coordination and a vision for
how to engage with the Congo?

 

At present there is hardly
any dialogue between the international community and the Congo
government. Diplomats have difficulty in gaining access to those who
hold real power and take decisions. We continue to lobby for an
explicitly political dialogue between the international community and
the government, based on a genuine will to contribute loyally to the
country’s development (with funding and expertise), as well as serious
pressure in priority areas (human rights, good governance, democratic
participation etc). What is needed is a road map with bench marks reached by common agreement. Such
criteria will allow progress in different sectors to be monitored. Of
course this dialogue must be one of mutual respect and partnership,
recognising the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Third Republic. But to
be effective, it is vital to advocate a greater degree of
multilateralism and coordination of the international community’s
actions. If the
international community wants to make a difference, it must show that
its members are working together in coherence. Yet it is divided at the
present time by strong bilateral interests. There is no unity and no
single voice. To succeed, China will have to be included in the search
for such a unified position.