31 05 11 Interview with MONUSCOs Chief of DDRRR
1. What are the operational workings of the DDR/RR Section?
DDR/RR has approximately 160 staff, most of whom are Congolese
nationals. The DDR/RR national headquarters are based in Goma with
provincial team sites in Kalemie (Katanga), Bukavu (South Kivu), Goma
(North Kivu), and Dungu (Oriental). Each of these provincial team sites
is responsible for deploying and maintaining field team sites in areas
close to where the combatants are operating. These team sites are nearly
always co-located with MONUSCO military contingents who ensure the
security of DDR/RR staff and the ex-combatants who wish to demobilize.
At any one time, DDR/RR is simultaneously operating 25 field team sites.
DDR/RR uses a variety of methods to convince combatants to return. The
first is through radio broadcasts on 14 mobile FM radios deployed at the
field team site level. These radios transmit messages from
ex-combatants, their family members and local authorities to urge the
combatants to leave the forest and return to civilian life. These
messages are also broadcast on Radio Okapi.
DDR/RR designs leaflets with messages from ex-combatants as well as
details about the repatriation and demobilization processes. This allows
the combatant to be better informed about what lies ahead and urges him
to take an informed decision about the next stage in his life. These
leaflets are distributed by hand or are dropped by helicopter. The
latter method allows DDR/RR to target areas which are difficult to
access.
The third way of sensitizing combatants is through sensitizing the
communities where they live. Working with the local community is a time
consuming but worthwhile in the long run. In DDDRRR, the voice giving
the message is often as important as the message itself so we try to get
the communities to participate as much as possible in convincing the
combatants to go back to civilian life.
Finally, DDR/RR also conducts direct negotiations with combatants.
DDR/RR staff members are specialized in developing relationships with
the combatants when they are still active. Combatants often have
legitimate concerns in regard to their security, the fate of their
families and future livelihoods. These negotiations address those
individual concerns with the aim of convincing the combatant to leave
the forest.
2. Can you explain the status of the foreign and Congolese armed groups in the DR Congo?
Yes – there are four main foreign armed groups operating in the DR
Congo. They include the FDLR who are composed of former members of the
Rwandan army and government as well as Rwandan refugees who entered DRC
in 1994 after the genocide. The FDLR is the largest group estimated at
between 2,000 and 2,500 combatants. These elements are located in the
Kivus and some parts of Katanga provinces. Another group is the Allied
Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel group that entered the DRC in
the late 1990s. They are an Islamist group and want to establish Sharia
law in Uganda. This group is highly secretive but we estimate their
force to be between 500 – 800 combatants. They operate in the Rwenzori
Mountain range along the Ugandan border, east of Beni. The third group
is the Lords Resistance Army or LRA. They are also a Ugandan rebel
group who have existed for over 20 years but only entered the DRC in
2005. The LRA are a particularly violent rebel group that has inflicted
considerable sufferings on civilians in their areas of operation. In the
DRC, the LRA are located in the Uele Territories of Oriental Province
but they are also located in eastern Central African Republic and
Southern Sudan. The remote location of the LRA makes this group
particularly challenging to sensitize. Finally, there is a Burundian
rebel group called the Forces Nationales de la Liberation (FNL) who
recently restarted activities in South Kivu. The FNL previously
integrated into the Burundian government and military but restarted
activities after the Burundian elections in 2010.
Congolese combatants are members of a variety of militia ranging from
self-defense groups to bandits who are mostly located in the Kivus. It
is important to understand that DDR/RR only assists the Congolese
government in demobilizing Congolese combatants, of which there are
approximately 4,000 believed to be left in the Kivus, with 1,000 of
those being members of foreign armed groups such as the FDLR or ADF.
3. What success stories can the DDR/RR Section recount as you tackle the question of foreign armed groups in the DR Congo?
Since 2002, DDR/RR repatriated over 24,000 foreign ex-combatants and
their dependents to their countries of origin. The number of
repatriations has increased almost three fold since the start of joint
military operations in the Kivus in 2009. Prior to 2009, DDR/RR was
repatriating an average of 50 foreign combatants a month, now the
monthly average is around 140. This is in addition to an almost equal
number of dependents. The vast majority of those repatriated are Rwandan
members of the FDLR but they also include the other foreign armed
groups as well as foreigners who were integrated into the FARDC.
DDR/RR has also assisted the government in demobilizing thousands of
Congolese combatants. The DDR process has gone through various stages
over the years. Now, with only 4,000 residual Congolese combatants left,
DDR/RR is working with the government to create a process that is
appropriate for those remaining. Currently, DDR/RR is processing about
100 Congolese combatants a month, most of them in North Kivu.
Since I arrived nearly two years ago, there has been a general
improvement in the situation and a reduction in the overall number of
illegal combatants in the DRC. The repatriation rate has similarly
increased not only in numbers but also in the rank of those coming out.
In 2011 alone, DDR/RR has repatriated some 20 FDLR officers including
three Colonels and five Majors. At the current rate of defection, the
FDLR will have difficulty continuing to exist compared to one or two
years ago.
DDR/RR has also assisted in judicial proceedings against the FDLR
leadership. By assisting German authorities and the International
Criminal Court, the three top leaders of the FDLR were arrested and are
on trial in Europe. Their arrest has had a significant impact on the
morale and the command structure and control of the FDLR and is
contributing to the continued defection of many in their ranks.
DDR/RR is also assisting FARDC in its training of officers on treatment
of foreign and national ex-combatants, gender and human rights.
By reducing the number of illegal combatants in the Kivus, DDR/RR is
contributing to the restoration of security and the creation of an
environment where the government can reassert control over its
territory. Both of these elements are vital to stabilization of the
country.
4. What are the main challenges of the DDR/RR Section?
DDR/RR has achieved these successes despite numerous challenges. The
first challenge is with the combatants themselves and the organization
which tries to prevent them from surrendering. All the militias use
propaganda to create fear and mistrust in the minds of the combatants to
prevent them from leaving. Convincing the combatant otherwise is a
major hurdle. In addition, the militias create physical barriers
punishing those who attempt to defect, sometimes the punishment is
death.
There are also security challenges for DDR/RR staff. We are a
significant existential threat to the existence of these militias and as
such our relationship with them is not always friendly. Just this year,
we have had a sensitizer abducted and staff ambushed, fortunately
without physical casualties. Nonetheless, the risk is there as DDRRR
operates on the frontline.
Additionally, our clients (foreign armed groups) reside in remote
locations and those who opt to voluntarily surrender to DDR/RR usually
face security threats and punishment from their leaders. This is one of
the areas where DDR/RR faces significant logistical challenges. They
have to be quickly extracted from those combatants who are anxious to
breakaway and come to us. Their extraction is made possible with support
from MONUSCO, which in spite of its huge operational demands and
limited transportation and security forces, responds positively to the
DDR/RR call.
5. Do you think your current strategy
regarding foreign armed groups is working? If not what new measures do
you intend to put in place?
I think the current strategy regarding foreign armed groups is still
working but we need to get better; adapt more quickly and more
effectively. By expanding our outreach and partner network we can
improve our messaging and our ability to contact clients directly in the
field. I think the success of our strategy is evident in the numbers
and ranks of those surrendering to MONUSCO and increasingly to FARDC.
The fact that illegal combatants still inflict pain and suffering on
Congolese populations means that we still have a lot of work to do.