04 02 12 – “U.S. Policy Toward Post-Election Democratic Republic of the Congo”

Members of the Committee. 
Assistant Secretary Carson sends his regrets that he 

could not be here today.  I
appreciate the Committee’s willingness to accept me as 

a witness in his place. 
 

 

Thank you for this
opportunity to testify before you concerning the post- 

election situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, or the DRC, and U.S. 

policy toward the DRC in the
aftermath of a seriously flawed presidential election 

and the ongoing challenges
with respect to legislative elections.  We are very 

concerned about the many
problems that have come to light regarding the conduct 

of these elections and are
seeking ways to ensure that these problems do not divert 

the country from the path
toward lasting peace and stability based on democratic 

principles.  Today I would
first like to briefly share our understanding of the 

context in which these recent
elections were held.  I will also very briefly outline 

U.S. pre-election efforts to
help set the stage for free and fair elections in the DRC.  

Finally, I will address the
effect of these flawed elections on our efforts to promote 

democratic principles and
long-term stability in the DRC.  

 

The importance of the DRC to
the United States is multifaceted and 

profound.  Our humanitarian
obligations to this country that has brutally suffered 

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so much drive our policy and
underpin our commitment to the Congolese people.  

Moreover, the stability of
central Africa in the near and long-term depends on the 

still precarious stability of
the DRC.  If the country returns to the 1993 to 2003 

levels of violence, all the
countries in the region could yet again be involved, 

leading to humanitarian
crises and regional instability.   

 

The DRC's turbulent history
has never allowed it to live up to its economic 

promise nor has it been able
to achieve the peace and stability its people 

desperately need and seek. 
The Congo's problems center around a lack of 

functioning state authority
throughout much of the country.  The state lacks the 

capacity to provide basic
services such as health care, education and infrastructure.  

The justice system and
bureaucracy are weak and lack capacity leaving them 

dysfunctional and lacking in
power.  The security forces are frequently 

undisciplined and often
ill-equipped, poorly trained and irregularly paid.  

Corruption is widespread and
impunity is the norm.  The problems are huge and 

pervasive.   

 

It is in this context that
the DRC held its second democratic election since 

the end of the Mobutu era. 
These were also the first elections wholly organized 

and directed by the Congolese
themselves since independence.  Unlike in 2006, 

when the elections were
largely managed by the UN and others in the international 

community, this time the
international community played a supporting rather than 

a leading role.   

 

There were numerous problems
with the elections, beginning with an 

abbreviated preparation
period.  The November 28, 2011 elections did not begin in 

earnest until last March when
the National Independent Electoral Commission — or 

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CENI — was established,
allowing just eight months to mount a national election in 

the largest country in
Sub-Saharan Africa, a country the size of the United States 

east of the Mississippi River
with a population of 71 million and almost no 

infrastructure.  With very
few roads, a dilapidated and limited rail system, and poor 

telecommunications, the
logistical challenges alone were enormous.  Further, in 

one of the poorest, least
literate countries in Africa — despite its vast resources and 

great potential — the
management, technical, and human resource challenges 

associated with establishing
more than 63,000 polling places and 169 counting 

centers were equally
daunting.  Under these circumstances problems were 

inevitable.   

 

Both national and
international observer missions, including the U.S.-funded 

Carter Center observer
mission, identified multiple flaws and irregularities in the 

election process, beginning
with the registration process and continuing through 

the vote tabulation process. 
The State Department has found the management and 

technical execution of these
elections to be seriously flawed, lacking in 

transparency and not on a par
with positive gains in the democratic process that we 

have seen in other recent
elections in the region and elsewhere.  The Secretary of 

State noted that we were
deeply disappointed that the electoral commission’s 

provisional results were
affirmed by the Supreme Court without a full investigation 

of alleged irregularities,
despite opportunities to do so.   

 

Eleven candidates vied for
the presidency and almost 19,000 candidates 

competed for 500 seats in
parliament.  The CENI announced the provisional 

presidential results on
December 9, declaring the incumbent, President Joseph 

Kabila, the winner with
approximately 49 percent of the vote.  Second place went 

to the leading opposition
candidate, Etienne Tshisekedi, with 32 percent of the 

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vote.  On December 20, 2011,
President Kabila was sworn in for his second five- 

year term in office.  It is
important to note that we do not know, and it might not be 

possible to determine with
any certainty, whether the final order of presidential 

candidates would have been
different from the final results had the management of 

the process been better. 
 

 

Mr. Tshisekedi and his
supporters have refused to accept defeat, going so far 

as to hold their own
swearing-in ceremony declaring that he is the rightful winner 

and, therefore, President of
the DRC.  In the run up to the election, Mr. Tshisekedi 

made several inflammatory
statements, including declaring himself president 

before the elections and
calling on his supporters to ―terrorize‖ the security forces 

and to break his party’s
political detainees out of jail.  Currently, Mr. Tshisekedi’s 

home remains surrounded by
police and his movements are severely restricted.  

Since the election, he has
made calls for the public to mobilize against the Kabila 

government.  Most recently he
called on the Congolese people to stage a general 

strike this past Monday. 
While he continues to be very popular within his 

constituency and many
supporters turned out for his parallel inauguration, his calls 

for general mobilization have
fallen flat.  Still, Mr. Tshisekedi’s political party 

remains the strongest
opposition party in the Congolese landscape and it is 

important that its voice be
included in the political dialogue. 

 

This election clearly fell
far, far short of internationally-accepted election 

standards in many ways, but I
cannot complete my discussion without also 

acknowledging a few
significant accomplishments represented by these elections:  

1. Unlike in 2006, the government of the DRC was
responsible for the 

majority of the financing of
these elections, an important first step.   

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2. The CENI registered over 32 million voters—some
in virtually 

inaccessible areas of the
country— an important feat as the voter card 

serves as the country’s
principal identity card. 

3. Over 18 million voters endured admittedly
difficult conditions – 

including long distances to
polling places on unpaved roads and heavy 

rains — to cast their votes.
 

4. The significant voter turnout on November
28th and enthusiasm and 

interest for these elections
were clear demonstrations of the 

determination of the
Congolese people to have their voices heard through 

the democratic process.  
 

 

The United States supported
the election process throughout, both through 

diplomatic engagement and
programmatic assistance aimed at civic education to 

prepare the Congolese people
to participate actively and productively in these 

elections.  Since FY 2009, we
have provided approximately $11.4 million to the 

International Foundation for
Electoral Systems (IFES) for civic and voter 

education activities.  In
FY2010, we provided approximately $4 million to The 

Carter Center for training
some 6,000 election observers.  We also provided 

training in crowd control as
well as non-lethal equipment to the Congolese 

National Police as part of
efforts to professionalize their conduct leading up to and 

following the elections.
 

 

We met continuously with all
of the major candidates throughout the 

election cycle.  We have
advocated and continue to advocate that all Congolese 

political leaders and their
supporters act responsibly, renounce violence and 

resolve any disagreements
through peaceful, constructive dialogue.  We also 

deployed observer teams from
the U.S. Mission in Kinshasa in each of the 10 

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provinces and Kinshasa,
allowing us to conduct first-hand observation of the 

election process across a
wide area of the DRC.  

 

We continue to coordinate our
efforts with international partners on the 

continent, including the UN
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo, 

known as MONUSCO, which
played a key role in providing logistical support for 

the elections.  It was our
diplomatic efforts — taken in conjunction with other 

donors — that were decisive
in providing some degree of transparency in the 

tabulation process by
demanding the CENI provide the data from the individual 

polling stations that
eventually revealed the extent of election flaws.   

 

Congo’s neighbors and other
countries in the region remain concerned about 

the political aftershocks in
the DRC and look for a political solution that will keep 

the country and the region
stable.  The fact that only one head of state from any 

continent — Zimbabwe’s
Robert Mugabe — attended Kabila’s December 20th 

inauguration speaks volumes
about the level of international concern about the 

elections.  President Kabila
has publicly acknowledged that there were, quote, 

"mistakes," unquote, in the
process but has reportedly rejected any assessment that 

the results would have been
any different were the process more credible. 

 

Since the presidential
election results were announced, we have spoken with 

President Kabila, Mr.
Tshisekedi, the CENI chair Pastor Mulunda, along with 

many other Congolese leaders
of political parties and civil society organizations.  

We meet regularly with
Congolese political party members and diaspora leaders in 

Washington, Kinshasa,
Brussels, and elsewhere.  We value the input of these 

varied political actors and
respect and admire their dedication to democratic 

principles.  Our ongoing
conversations with these Congolese leaders as well as our 

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international partners and
our analysis of reports on the elections by The Carter 

Center, the EU, and our own
election experts are helping us assist Congolese actors 

in determining the best way
forward with respect to these elections.   

 

We continue to urge the
relevant Congolese authorities to complete the 

remaining steps in the
legislative electoral process by proceeding with maximum 

openness and transparency. 
This is especially important for the 500 National 

Assembly seats, where, unlike
the presidential elections, a small number of votes 

can determine the winner.  
 

 

To coordinate our efforts in
the DRC and the region on December 9 

Secretary Clinton announced
the appointment of Ambassador Barrie Walkley as 

the new Special Advisor for
the Great Lakes Region and the DRC.  As we speak, 

Ambassador Walkley is in the
region.  He spent last week in the DRC focusing on 

armed groups and conflict
minerals issues.  He also went to Rwanda and Burundi.  

In addition, Ambassador
Walkley is convening a group of European partners here 

in Washington next week to
further discuss the way ahead in the DRC and the 

region.  He also will be
available to meet with Committee members about his 

initial travel in Central
Africa as the Special Advisor.   

 

The United States and its
international partners can play an important role in 

the future of democracy and
stability in the Congo and the region.  To move 

forward and consolidate any
modicum of democratic gains, the United States 

Government presently is
exploring how to best help the Government of the DRC 

improve its electoral
architecture.  Elections, however, are but one part of 

democracy and governance. 
There also needs to be increased space for political 

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participation.  We are
determining both short-term and longer term ways in which 

we can assist. 

 

In addition, as a way of
moving forward, we support the formation of an 

inclusive DRC government. 
There are many democratic benefits to an inclusive 

government.  Giving the
opposition a voice will assure their stake in government 

operations and will advance
the broader goal of political inclusion and stability. 

We are not advocating a
coalition government in encouraging this inclusivity. 

Finally, an expected delay in
the Provincial Assembly elections originally 

scheduled for March may allow
time for the CENI to implement reforms based on 

the lessons learned from the
presidential and legislative elections.  These elections 

are crucial, as the members
of the Provincial Assemblies elect the members of the 

Senate and the governors of
the provinces. 

 

In addition to the current
political situation, there are other elements that are 

essential to addressing the
concerns about the long-term stability of the DRC.  One 

of those critical elements is
to counter the threat of rebel armed groups and 

establish sustainable
security, something that has eluded the country for decades.  

We continue to work closely
with the people and government of the DRC on 

enhancing the protection of
its civilian population through professionalization of 

the police and the military.
 

 

Combating the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) continues to be a particular 

priority for us.  The LRA’s
atrocities are an affront to human dignity and a threat to 

regional stability.  In line
with the legislation passed by Congress in 2010, we are 

pursuing a comprehensive,
multi-year strategy to help our partners in the region to 

better mitigate and
ultimately eliminate the threat to civilians and regional security 

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posed by the LRA.  A key part
of this strategy is the deployment of  a small 

number of USG military
advisors to enhance the capacity of the regional militaries 

pursuing the LRA to better
bolster civilian protection, expand early warning 

networks, and address the
humanitarian needs of communities terrorized by the 

LRA.  The United States will
continue to stand with the people and governments of 

Africa as they stand up and
work together to end the LRA’s reign of terror, and 

establish sustainable peace
and security.  Doing that is on the right side of history, 

on the right side of our
values, and on the right side of our strategic interests. 

 

We are also concerned about
the illicit trade in the DRC's natural resources.  

Unregulated exploitation and
illicit trade in minerals have exacerbated the climate 

of insecurity in the Eastern
DRC as armed groups have used profits from such 

trade to fund their illegal
activities.  We currently have approximately $11 million 

in FY 2010 funds specifically
aimed at increasing the transparency and regulation 

of the trade in key minerals
in the eastern DRC, much of which is conducted 

illegally.  We also recently
notified Congress of an additional $4.7 million in FY 

2011 Complex Crisis Fund
resources that we will apply to promoting traceability 

and monitoring in the
regional minerals trade.  

 

Continued support for MONUSCO
and its efforts to help the Congolese 

government bring peace and
stability to the country is also critical.  We recognize 

that sustainable peace and
stability in Eastern Congo will require professional and 

accountable Congolese
security forces and a strong and independent judicial 

system.  To that end, in
addition to our own efforts to provide human rights 

training to security forces
and strengthen judicial courts, we, along with the 

European Union, MONUSCO and
other donors, coordinate efforts to strengthen 

the democratic nature of
these important institutions.   

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The United States is also
very much focused on other very important issues 

in the Congo, several of
which relate closely to what I have already discussed 

today.  We want to help
strengthen good governance in the long term, promote 

economic development, improve
human rights, support judicial and wider security 

sector reform and end the
cycle of impunity.  We recognize that there are a number 

of significant challenges to
making meaningful and long-term gains in these areas.    

 

However, the DRC and the
United States have a solid and positive 

relationship and our
governments continue to engage at the highest level on a range 

of issues that aim towards a
more democratic, peaceful and stable Congo.   

 

Mr. Chairman and Members of
the Committee, thank you again for the 

opportunity to appear before
you today.  I will be happy to answer any questions.