01 08 13 DOES CONGO CONFUSION TRANSFORM INTO COMMUNICATION CHAOS?
A
few facts to clarify a profusion of information and disinformation: The
security
zone
stretches along Goma’s urban borders. In the south is is confined by Lake Kivu,
while in the west it goes up to Sake, in the east along Rwanda’s border to DRC.
The northern boundary, the most crucial one goes horizontally from Sake until
south of Kibati hill (which is south of Kibati town) and stops at the current
FARDC frontline against M23.
What
does this mean?
First
of all, the security zone is an area to be established around Goma, free of any
non-authorised armed elements, meaning neither FARDC nor Congolese police, nor
any other state service that is allowed to carry guns. This means all sorts of
militias and bandits are targeted. They are asked to disarm and show up at
MONUSCO DDR/RR centres until August 2 in the afternoon. MONUSCO,
at today’s weekly UN press conference has declared that
a)
the security zone is not an offensive instrument but merely to implement the
UN’s protection of civilians (PoC) mandate according to resolution
2098
b)
it is not directed aginst M23 but all armed groups/actors. So far the brief
statement given by acting SRSG Soumaré.
So,
who is targeted then, and what will be the consequences of a
refusal?
First
of all, recent skirmishes between FARDC and M23 appear to have repulsed the
latter northwards. There are unconfirmed reports that even M23′s military HQ has
been moved away from Rumangabo,
the site of FARDC helicopter attacks that had allegedly causes numerous civilian
casualties (a fact confirmed by M23 while denied by FARDC). However, these
reports would need further confirmation. It seems clear, though, that M23 is
delocalised from their former strongholds between Munigi and Kibati, and several
observers confirm these areas controlled by FARDC now (this is the zone
northeast of MONUSCO’s security zone (see map linked
above).
Still,
it is possible that some M23 units maintain position within or at the margins of
the security zone. They would then possibly fall under MONUSCO’s ultimatum.
Otherwise, there is reason to believe that other armed groups may have some
(few) hidden positions within the zone. Possible actors are FDLR, APCLS, Nyatura
– some of whom may however enjoy a double status, at least in the eyes of FARDC
and the Congolese state that had coopted and/or integrated some militias
(notably APCLS and Nyatura) and done other sorts of collaboration (with FDLR).
And there is a certain amount of loosely organised gangs operating around and in
Goma.
What
is going to happen?
This
is basically the most dangerous question to ask. Information, even of properly
dissected remains vague and many questions remain open. It could be that just
nothing happens after the countdown, as the remaining armed elements (given the
margin of the security zone there is probably no major contingent of non-FARDC
combatants within the area) may just hide and remain idle for some
time.
Another
point is that little is known so far as to which extent the DRC government and
the UN leaders in New York have mandated, authorised, or accepted this move by
MONUSCO. Also, the deployment details are unclear. Both the North Kivu Brigade
(of the standard MONUSCO contingent) and the FIB are officially tasked in
creating and upholding the security zone. What we do not know is how they will
split up tasks and whether the FIB (probably no other part of the peacekeeping
mission) will engage in coercive action or fighting if the ultimatum is
violated.
MONUSCO
also acknowledged that it is not in shape to tackle all armed actors at the same
time (a situation well
predicted by Congolese researcher Josaphat Musamba two weeks
ago)
which is why they will start securing Goma and move on from there. But it
remains difficult to predict this, as maybe even within MONUSCO things are not
that clear concerning the upcoming weeks.
In
the meantime, the ICGLR heads of state and government summit in Nairobi (with
DRC on top of the agenda) ends, and President Kabila has recalled his cabinet to
be present in Kinshasa on Friday (although it is unclear if linked to the Kivu
situation).
Given
these uncertainties, the best thing for now is to concentrate on accurate
observation of the facts on the ground and prevent too much of confusion, such
as happening today. Also, concerns should be raised in terms of the humanitarian
impact a possible confrontation after the ultimatum would
have.
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