10 06 14 Kuenga Amani – Post-M23 Euphoria and the Recurrent Peace Dividends in Eastern DRC

The
recent killing of Paul Sadala, although little reported and largely unnoticed
internationally,¹ serves
as a reminder of how tenuous the “peace” that was achieved in the eastern part
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remains with the defeat of the March
23 movement (M23) rebels.² Sadala,
also known as “Morgan,” was the leader of the Mayi Mayi
militia.³ In
the company of about forty militiamen,⁴ Sadala
had left his hideout in the forest of Ituri to surrender to the Congolese army
(known as Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, or FARDC), lay
down his arms, and demobilize. Before he could be escorted from Molokai to
Bunia, (Ituri District’s capital), however, Sadala and army officers quarreled,
allegedly over Sadala’s demand for an immediate promotion to general of the
FARDC. Heavily injured in the ensuing battle, Sadala died before he could be
handed over to the nearby troops of the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), who
were supposed to fly him out to a hospital.

As
with the murder of FARDC colonel Mamadou Ndala in January, competing
explanations by FARDC, the Congolese government, MONUSCO, and individual
politicians regarding who bore responsibility for the escalation of the argument
and subsequent death of Sadala have made it difficult to determine exactly what
happened.⁵ Yet
one thing is obvious: the remnants of Mayi Mayi (now being led by Docteur
Jean-Pierre and Manu Mboko) remain a threat to wildlife, gold miners, and
civilians in southwest Ituri district and northwest Beni
territory.⁶

The
incident comes at a critical juncture in the demobilization of the Kivu
Region.⁷ The
December 2013 national Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program
(DDR III)⁸ represents
the latest government effort to tackle the societal reintegration of the rebels
while avoiding the numerous pitfalls experienced by the two programs that
preceded it.⁹ While
the new plan still suffers from divergent viewpoints between the capital
Kinshasa and most donors, FARDC is busy negotiating with many different militias
across North and South Kivu, and diplomatic sources recently stated they are
ready to provide substantial support to the government. However, the envisioned
collaboration has so far not materialized; both the structure and content of the
plan remain in dispute, with Western governments and the United Nations (UN)
being highly sceptical of the DRC government’s scheme to relocate combatants by
flying them out from the eastern Congo to Bas-Congo, Equateur, and Katanga
provinces.¹⁰

In
the meantime, this deadlock has exacerbated the dire social conditions of the
ex-combatants and their dependents—most notably in the town of Bweremana, where
the bulk of them are concentrated—relieved only by MONUSCO’s
“humanitarian”¹¹ engagement
and the government’s rising awareness of the suffering. In January 2014, shortly
before the government launched the transfer of combatants, these conditions had
led to some defections from the camp where ex-combatants were cantoned and
raised fears over of a total collapse of the new program before it actually even
started.¹²

While
such a failure can still be avoided, the fate of DDR III hangs by a thread. The
exact number of ex-combatants already transferred to the demobilization centers
in Kotakoli, Kamina, and Kitona are unclear, and there is conflicting
information on whether they correspond to the numbers mentioned in government
documents; on what proportion of the combatants has already been transferred;
and on the reliability of the numbers collected in the different camps. As Aloys
Tegera suggests, the early stages of DDR III have been fraught with uncertainty
about how the subsequent steps are going to be organized.¹³ While
spokesperson Lambert Mende has explained that the Congolese government aims to
avoid past mistakes such as hasty reintegration, insufficient vetting, and
parallel command chains,¹⁴ its
irresolution could lead to new ones.

This
year so far has seen a gradual backing off, not only from pushing forward the
DDR III agenda—which is more or less underway, though still lacking sufficient
donor support—but also from employing a more coercive military logic. Through
its armed forces, the Congolese government has established or reestablished a
series of negotiations with numerous armed groups, such as Mayi Mayi Nyakiliba,
Raia Mutomboki Kalehe, Raia Mutomboki Kigulube, Raia Mutomboki Nduma, and Mayi
Mayi Morgan, while pursuing large-scale military operations against others, such
as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)-Nalu, the Alliance of Patriots for a Free
and Sovereign Congo (APCLS), and Mayi Mayi Yakutumba, with considerable backing
from MONUSCO and its Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). Fighters in the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), some of whom participated
in the Rwandan genocide, were announced as both FARDC’s and MONUSCO’s prime
target for the year 2014. However, despite numerous affirmations that operations
to neutralize the group would soon gain momentum, the focus seems largely to
have drifted away from the FDLR. As well, certain other armed groups, such as
Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka’s Nduma Defense of Congo (NDC) and various Nyatura groups,
do not appear as main concerns at this point.

Though
the circumstances are unclear, Sadala’s killing is unlikely to contribute to
other militias’ willingness to demobilize. A promising momentum heralded by
groups such as Popular Movement for Self-Defence (MPA), Forces for the Defence
of the Interests of the Congolese People (FDIPC), and others laying down their
arms following M23’s demise is on the verge of being wasted. In addition, the
ongoing anti-APCLS operations—which have so far massively weakened the
Masisi-based militia commanded by General Janvier Karairi—happen partly with the
implicit support of certain Nyatura outlets.¹⁵ Mirroring
the politicized struggle between Hunde and Hutu populations in Masisi, the
shifting power relations between APCLS and Nyatura, as well as a dangerous
partiality pursued by both FARDC and MONUSCO, make for a potentially escalating
security dilemma in North Kivu’s most complex area.¹⁶ Beyond
the Masisi conundrum, these operations will sooner or later bear on FDLR-related
questions too, even if the bulk of the FDLR have moved northward into
neighboring Lubero and Rutshuru territories.

Similar
circumstances prevail in South Kivu. In mid-April, the Kigulube branch of Raia
Mutomboki (mainly constituted from the defunct coalition Raia Mukombozi) sent
one of its leaders, General Maheshe, to a demobilization site to demonstrate
willingness to join the FARDC-led process. All available evidence indicates this
was a plain maneuver of distraction. While they continue to engage in
negotiations with the FARDC, none of the Raia Mutomboki chapters appear to be
sincere about surrendering at this stage, and the government’s intentions—along
with its ability to take over the provision of security across Shabunda,
Walungu, Kalehe, and (in North Kivu) Walikale territories—are in
doubt.¹⁷

Further
to the south, William Amuri Yakutumba’s Forces Armées Alleluia—one of the
largest Mayi Mayi militias—currently fights FARDC regiments over control of
Misisi in Fizi territory. Recent analysis from this area suggests that combat
started in March has heightened levels of insecurity.¹⁸Meanwhile,
Mayi Mayi Mayele opted out of the integration process, and half a dozen small
militias have newly emerged in Fizi, Uvira, and southern Mwenga
territories.

Overall,
this picture does not quite correspond to the more euphoric forecasts made in
the aftermath of M23’s disappearance. But does it mean the rhetoric of MONUSCO
and the Congolese government is a full-scale ruse?

Not
exactly; some encouraging signs and events show that the picture is not all bad.
Despite whatever political games and competitions have set the Congolese army on
the path of negotiation, it’s being there is vital to any long-term solution.
The risk, rather, is to end up with half-baked deals, hastened army integration
(which is officially denied, but possibly occurring nevertheless), and
contradictory action.¹⁹ Almost
unavoidable, the latter originates from elite competition within the Congolese
army and government. It is most noticeable in the deadlock regarding anti-FDLR
operations and adds up to the divergent philosophies of FARDC and
MONUSCO.

If
discourses and practices are not consolidated and aligned, the risk will be high
for the current range of contradictory activities regarding armed group
demobilization in the wider sense. These activities include DDR III, military
operations, other negotiations, and Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation,
Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) for foreign groups, which will
eventually wind up in a cul-de-sac. At the same time, the proliferation of armed
groups remains a massive obstacle to peace.²⁰ Evidence
from both Kivu provinces demonstrates that, so far, neither robust peacekeeping
nor efforts to regulate mineral exploitation in the region have helped dispel
the eastern DRC’s militia curse. The FIB, whose decisive approach is almost
antithetical to UN peacekeeping’s proverbial risk aversion, was certainly much
more successful in the past than was expected by analysts, but it lost drive
when facing the FDLR challenge. Furthermore, the fight against “conflict
minerals”—despite correlating with a reduction of on-site predation through
armed actors in the mining areas—created an embargo-like reality where joining a
militia became fashionable again in the absence of other opportunities for quick
income.²¹

The
examples of M23 and ADF showcase the positive potential of decisive peace
enforcement, but neither the unsatisfactory “peace agreement” following the
FARDC-FIB success against M23, nor the atomization of ADF into much less
powerful but persistent micro-units, are long-term solutions. While they are
effective steps toward improving the security of civilians in certain areas,
they remain mere starting points for establishing a safe and secure Kivu. Beyond
these operational concerns, the quest for peace needs to be understood as a
molecular process involving at least as much of a bottom-up as a top-down
logic.

Joining
forces toward a more comprehensive approach does not, however, entail the
amalgamation of peacekeeping, humanitarian action, development aid, and
peacebuilding, either.²² In
such a complex effort of various local, national, and international
stakeholders, the particularity of the respective actors contributes to a
broader good. It is unlikely to be a fast-selling item, and it will not
automatically resolve DRC’s multilayered contest over political power, state
control, and socioeconomic capital. The transformation of Congo’s crisis economy
into a social system characterized by peaceful cohabitation and exchange is
going to be a lengthier process that will depend on the negotiation of
governance modes ²³ in
an arena framed by overlapping sovereignties. The aim of peacebuilding in DRC
certainly merits such efforts, in both DDR and beyond.

 

1. Radio
France Internationale, “RD Congo: Le chef rebelle Morgan tué lors de son
transfert vers Bunia,” (DR Congo: Rebel leader Morgan killed during transfer to
Bunia) April 14, 2014, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140414-rdc-congo-chef-rebelle-morgan-paul-sadala-mort-tue-fardc
(accessed April 26, 2014). ↩

2. M23
used to be eastern Congo’s largest and best coordinated nonstate armed group,
controlling large parts of territory in the north of Goma. After roughly 1.5
years of insurrection they were eventually defeated by UN forces and the
Congolese army. ↩

3. Luca
Jourdan, “Mayi Mayi: Young Rebels in Kivu, DRC,” Africa Development 36, no. 3
and 4 (2011): 89–111. ↩

4. He
was certainly not with the full line-up of his forces, which are believed to
comprise between 100 and 300 combatants, depending on whether “borrowed”
fighters are included in the calculation. See United Nations, “Final Report of
the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2014/42),”
United Nations, New York, 2014, and United Nations, “Final Report of the UN
Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2012/843),” United
Nations, New York, 2012. ↩

5. Radio
Okapi, “La mort du chef milicien Paul Sadala ‘Morgan,’ ” (The death of militia
leader Paul Sadala ‘Morgan’) April 16, 2014, http://radiookapi.net/emissions-2/dialogue-entre-congolais/2014/04/16/ce-soir-la-mort-du-chef-milicien-paul-sadala-morgan/
(accessed April 26, 2014). ↩

6. IRIN,
“Rainforest Riches a Curse for Civilians in Northeast DRC,” January 23, 2013, http://www.irinnews.org/report/97314/rainforest-riches-a-curse-for-civilians-in-northeast-drc
(accessed April 26, 2014). ↩

7. IRIN,
“Briefing: DDR in Eastern DRC—Try, Try Again,” March 4, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/99741/briefing-ddr-in-eastern-drc-try-try-again
(accessed April 26, 2014). ↩

8. Ministère
de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, “Plan global de désarmement,
démobilisation et réinsertion (DDR III),” (Global plan on Disarmament,
Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR III)) République Démocratique du Congo,
Kinshasa (2013); and Ministère de la défense nationale et des anciens
combattants, “Plan des opérations conjointes de désarmement et de démobilisation
pour le DDR III,” (Plan on joint operations of Disarmament and Demobilisation
for the DDR III) République Démocratique du Congo, Kinshasa (2013). Both
documents are on file with the author. ↩

9. Christoph
Vogel, “Many Hitches Ahead for Congo’s New DDR. Time to Get Over Them,” December
27, 2013, http://christophvogel.net/2013/12/27/many-hitches-ahead-for-congos-new-ddr/
(accessed April 26, 2014). ↩

10. Confidential
discussions held with several bi- and multilateral stakeholders between January
and April 2014. ↩

11. In
contrary to general belief, a peacekeeping mission comprised of armed soldiers
cannot be humanitarian by definition. This does not exclude that peacekeeping
can have lots of positive impacts but calling the actions of such a mission
“humanitarian“ is misleading. ↩

12. Christoph
Vogel, “Dancing on the Razorblades of Meaningful DDR in DRC,” January 26, 2014,
http://christophvogel.net/2014/01/26/dancing-on-the-razorblades-of-meaningful-ddr-in-eastern-drc/
(accessed April 26, 2014). ↩

13. Aloys
Tegera, “DDR 3: Inquietudes et interrogations,” (DDR 3: Worries and questions)
Pole Institute, Goma, April 25, 2014, http://pole-institute.org/index.php/nouvelles/331-ddr-3-inquietudes-et-interrogations
(accessed April 26, 2014). ↩

14. Jason
Stearns, Maria Eriksson-Baaz, and Judith Verweijen, “The National Army and Armed
Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Insecurity,” Usalama
Project, Rift Valley Institute, London, 2013. ↩

15. Action
pour le Développement des Populations Defavorisées, “Masisi en proie de
violences: Encore un vaste mouvement de populations!” (Masisi
victim of violence: One more vast displacement trend) ADPD, Masisi,
2014. ↩

16. Jason
Stearns, “PARECO: Land, Local Strongmen and the Roots of Militia Politics in
North Kivu,” Usalama Project, Rift Valley Institute, London, 2013. ↩

17. Interviews
with Raia Mutomboki commanders and unedited field reports between January and
April 2014. ↩

18. Centre
Indépendant de Recherches et d’Etudes Stratégiques au Kivu, “La semaine du 14 au
21 mars,” (The week from March 14 to 21), CIRESKI, Uvira, 2014. ↩

19. Maria
Eriksson-Baaz and Judith Verweijen, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The
Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army,” report for the DRC Affinity Group,
Social Science Research Council, New York, 2013. ↩

20. Christoph
Vogel, “The Evolving Landscape of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic
Congo,” www.christophvogel.net/mapping
(accessed April 26, 2014). ↩

21. Conflict
minerals are minerals presumed to contribute to financing the war efforts of
different conflict actors in eastern Congo. They include tin, tantalum,
tungsten, and gold and are usually referred to as “3TG”. While numerous advocacy
campaigns have informed recent US legislation on this matter, academic research
clearly shows that the exploitation of such minerals are a means, not an end in
itself. Hence, the struggle against these conflict minerals has so far resulted
in a range of negative consequences on the local levels in eastern Congo. See
Dominic Johnson, “No Kivu, No Conflict. The Misguided Struggle against ‘Conflict
Minerals’ in the DRC,” Pole Institute, Goma, 2013, and discussions with the team
of “Obama’s Law,” based on their research for an upcoming feature-length
documentary on “conflict minerals,” www.obamaslaw.com (accessed April 26,
2014). ↩

22. Katharine
Derderian, Aurelie Ponthieu, and Christoph Vogel, “Without Precedent or
Prejudice? UNSC Resolution 2098 and Its Potential Implications for Humanitarian
Space in Eastern Congo and Beyond,” Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, January
21, 2014, http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/2032
(accessed April 26, 2014). ↩

23. Timothy
Raeymakers, Ken Menkhaus, and Koen Vlassenroot, “State and Non-State Regulation
in African Protracted Crises: Governance without Government?” Afrika
Focus 21, No. 2 (2008): 7–21. ↩